IN PURSUIT OF CONSTITUTIONAL WELFARE
RIGHTS: ONE VIEW OF RAWLS'
THEORY OF JUSTICE
FRANK I.

MICHELMANt

A Theory of Justice' is a remarkable book. It is learned and
ambitious, deep (though multileveled), subtle (though lucid), rich and
complex. It has been received with favor and fanfare by distinguished
philosophical critics.2 Its topic can hardly be disdained by devotees of
the law.
Some books are like cathedrals. Depth, subtlety, richness and
complexity may retard comprehension however much they reward it
ultimately. It is impossible to grasp and absorb this book's architectonic, hence its meaning, by simply reading it through no matter how
studiously. Some sort of focused interrogative strategy may help one
come to grips with Professor Rawls' monumental utterance. I have
chosen to seek understanding through this not-so-philosophical question: How does the book bear upon the work of legal investigators
concerned or curious about recognition, through legal processes, of
claimed affirmative rights (let us call them "welfare rights") to education, shelter, subsistence, health care and the like, or to the money
3
these things cost?
On the face of it, the bearing would appear to be direct and
profound. An apparent main purpose of Rawls' book is to advance
and clarify discourse about claims respecting distribution, transfer,
and provision of social goods including material social goods-income,
wealth, and what you can buy with them. Opinion abounds (Rawls
evidently shares it) 4 that our society is marked by evident and severe
distributive injustice. Followers of the law may fairly worry about
seeming disconnection between our ingrained notions of a legal order
and these urgent, if debatable,5 questions of distributive justice-at
least insofar as we mean by "distributive justice" an outcome-oriented
tProfessor of Law, Harvard Unversity. BA. 1957, Yale University; LL.B. 1960,

Harvard University.
1 J.RAwr.s, A THEORY o JUSTICE (1971)
2

[hereinafter cited as RAWLS].

E.g., Hampshire, A New Philosophy for the Jist Society, N.Y. REv. or Booxs,

Feb. 24, 1972.
8 I shall have in mind mostly claims against "sovereign" legislatures, or against
their agents or instrumentalities.
4

5

RAWLS 87.

See, e.g., Bell, On Meritocracy and Equality, 29 PUB. INTmRsT 29 (1972).
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appraisal of the pattern and makeup of distributive "shares" precipitated by economic, political, and other societal processes, as distinguished from concern for the correctness of the processes themselves
or the purity of their application. For it can hardly be doubted that
the mainstream of our legal tradition has largely bypassed the outcome-appraising sort of distributional concern. Lawyers and jurists, like
economists and political scientists, seem to have instinctively placed
distributive-share questions beyond the province of their specialized
analysis, "science," and technique.' They work under a paradigm of
legal order which is noticeably lacking in norms, principles, and
categories of analysis directly applicable to the evaluation of distributional outcomes. The notion of justice inhabiting that paradigm has
been essentially corrective and regulative, stabilizing and preservative
-if not of any extant distributional configuration, then of an extant
framework of procedures and practices within which distributions are
secreted. Insofar as the legal system and its operatives have not abstained entirely from the distributive-share thicket, their modern
forays into it have often and to many appeared fitful, unprincipled,
and apologetic. 7
Perhaps the legal order's failure to deal confidently with distributive share questions betrays an underlying, widely shared (if uneasy
and often unacknowledged) conviction that a good distribution is unknowable except as the actual historical outcome of a good procedure
-that justice consists precisely in abiding the outcome of a just procedure, and injustice in corruption of the procedure or refusal to
accept its results.' Even if some philosophers can rise above that conviction, there may conceivably be other considerations endemic in a
"proper" (or optimally useful) idea of a legal order which could
explain its lack of focus on issues of distributive-share justice. Most
plausibly, public acceptance-presumably an essential trait of a legal
order-might be felt to depend on the system's finding refuge in
"neutral" procedures from evident authorship of particular outcomes.9
6
See Tribe, Policy Science: Analysis or Ideology, 2 Pm.. & PuB. AxnRs 66, 82
(1972).
7
See, e.g., Schoettie, The Equal Protection Clause in Public Education, 71 Covonr.
L. REv. 1355, 1416-18 (1971), and opinions cited therein. See also Winter, Poverty,
Economic Equality, and the Equal Protection Clause, 1972 SuP. CT. REV. 41.
8 A complete theory and argument along these lines is under preparation by Professor

Robert Nozick. His forthcoming Anarchy, State, and Utopia will criticize Rawls' work
from just this standpoint.

9
Tribe, supra note 6, at 82, suggests another explanation for "proceduralism" in
legal thought: that it "has served largely as an 'economic' vehicle of concern for end-

result maximization"--i.e., the procedures have been justified "in terms of their supposed tendency to maximize aggregate satisfaction in the end.' This interpretation converges with the one in the text in its suggestion of unconcern with distributive shares as

distinguished from production totals.
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Yet neither explanation of the legal order's preoccupation with procedural justice is fully satisfactory if it can be shown that some outcomeevaluative principles are accepted more or less consensually in society,
even if only intuitively and abstractly. If there are such latent consensual notions of justice in distributive shares, if these are ostensibly

dishonored by society's economic and political institutions, and if
these failures are in turn ignored by the legal organs, then there might
be cause for concern about continued public acceptance of the total
system-though not necessarily reason to conclude that it is the legal
organs that have failed, or through which the way to salvation now
lies.
Now Rawls presents an argument calculated to persuade us that
such outcome-oriented notions of distributive-share justice do indeed
exist. He tries to show how "our" introspectively detected "moral
capacity" or "sense of justice"--meaning the whole set of our day-today moral judgments together with the supporting reasons we would
tend to give (our "considered judgements")-can be parsimoniously
captured in a few abstract statements (the "principles of justice").o
These principles are connected up with a few other weak and broadly
acceptable posits (those governing the "original position")" by a
striking and appealing (contractarian) form of argument, designed to
show that they are the principles which would be unanimously adopted
by persons of whose traits and situation those posits were true.' 2 The
'oThe definitive statement of the principles may be found in note 23 infra.
1
'Persons in the original position are assumed to be (a) mutually disinterested,
being neither envious of nor dependent upon one another's well-being, RAwLs 143, 281,
538, and (b) rational, meaning that their happiness is determined by success in carrying
out a long-term plan of life "designed to permit the harmonious satisfaction of ...
interests" by "schedul~ing] activities so that various desires can be fulfilled without interference." Id. 93. Such persons prefer for themselves more rather than less of the social
"primary goods"-"rights and liberties, opportunities and powers, income and wealth,"
and "a sense of one's own worth'--required for carrying out such plans. Id. 92. They are
formal and moral equals with regard to their claims to participate and have their views
counted, id. 19, a condition made operative in the original position by a requirement of
unanimous agreement on the principles of justice, id. 141-42. And they are equals with
respect to their claims to happiness or success in carrying out their plans, a condition
made operative by the supposition that they deliberate under a "veil of ignorance" as to
their actual, particular circumstances, and by the associated requirements that any principles of justice selected be general and universal. Id. 131-33.
12 The following paragraph seems to capture much of the essence of the contractarian
approach:
[Flor one who understands and accepts the contract doctrine, the sentiment of
justice is not a different desire from that to act on principles that rational individuals would consent to in an initial situation which gives everyone equal
representation as a moral person. Nor is it different from wanting to act in accordance with principles that express men's nature as free and equal rational
beings. The principles of justice answer to these descriptions and this fact
allows us to give an acceptable interpretation to the sense of justice. In the
light of the theory of justice we understand how the moral sentiments can be
regulative in our life and have the role attributed to them by the formal conditions on moral principles. Being governed by these principles means that we
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whole scheme-abstractly stated principles embedded in their contractarian derivation-composes a "moral theory" which is supposed
to impart a sense of system to the day-to-day, intuitive considered
judgments we already have. Rawls evidently expects that "our" considered judgments will turn out to be on the whole, but not uniformly,
consistent with the philosophically elaborated moral theory. Thus the
moral theory-insofar as successful-can serve to clarify our understanding of, and strengthen our commitment to, our day-to-day considered judgments and can also serve, through its own coherence and
general consistency with our more casual sense of justice, to alter
those day-to-day judgments at least'marginally. We can test the theory
by the closeness of its fit to our judgments, after those have undergone
adjustment in light of exposure to the theory-what Rawls calls our
judgments in "reflective equilibrium."' 3
The theory is thus expressly aimed at bringing out and systematizing moral notions which are supposed to be already implanted in the
bulk of the book's readership. Moreover, the suggested principles of
justice, while relying in part on elements of "pure procedural justice,"
do ultimately demand, in addition, appraisal of outcomes.' 4 And these
principles, and the arguments supporting them, appear to proceed from
the broad tradition of "western" individualistic democratic liberalism
want to live with others on terms that everyone would recognize as fair from a
perspective that all would accept as reasonable. The ideal of persons cooperating
on this basis exercises a natural attraction upon our affections.
Id. 478.
13
For discussion of the mutual adjustment of principles and considered judgments,
and the resultant state of reflective equilibrium, see id. 19-22, 46-52, 579.
14 See, e.g., id. 507-08. "[P]ure procedural justice," says Rawls, "obtains when there
is no independent criterion for the right result: instead there is a correct or fair procedure such that the outcome is likewise correct or fair, whatever it is, provided that
the procedure has been properly followed." Id. 86.
The interaction in Raws' theory between a "pure procedural" orientation and an
"outcome" or "substantive justice" orientation is complex and quite fascinating. The
original position can itself be regarded as a procedure so constructed that whatever
principles emerge will be ipso facto "just"--the idea, as Rawls says, being "to use the
notion of pure procedural justice as a basis of theory." Id. 136. Yet the procedure is
deliberately constructed so that it will yield principles generally conforming to whatever substantive notions we start with, id. 19-20--such as those of moral and formal
equality, mentioned in note 11 supra. Of course, the rabbit that goes in the hat is, however transformed by contractarian magic, the rabbit that comes out; and just as the
original position is a procedure both cherished for its own procedural sake and constrained by substantive notions of freedom and equality, so is the social system implied
by the resulting principles of justice:
The intuitive idea is familiar. Suppose that law and government act effectively
to keep markets competitive, resources fully employed, property and wealth . . .
widely distributed . . . , and to guarantee a reasonable social minimum. Assume
also that there is fair equality of opportunity underwritten by education for all;
and that the other equal liberties are secured. Then it would appear that the
resulting distribution . . . will tend to satisfy the difference principle [paragraph
(a) of the Second Principle of Justice, note 23 infra]. In this complex of institutions, which we think of as establishing social justice in the modem state, the
advantages of the better situated improve the conditions of the least favored.
RAwLs 87.
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within which our characteristic notions of legal order and doctrine
have arisen.:"

One can thus well imagine that constitutional lawyers and scholars,
seeking or weighing legal definition, recognition, and enforcement of
welfare rights, would eagerly take to Rawls in search of a principled
account of such rights-one which could be used to support or explain
such legal events (actual or desired) as inclusion of specific welfare
guaranties in a constitution 0 or determinations by the judiciary that
some such guaranties are already present in the spacious locutions of,
say, section one of the fourteenth amendment.YT
By a "specific welfare guaranty" (or, as I shall sometimes say,
an "insurance right") I mean a right to provision for a certain need
-on the order of shelter, education, medical care-as and when it
accrues. I put the matter this way even though, as will appear, it is
easier and more natural to find in Rawls support for more generally
formulated rights to guaranteed money income at some fixed or calculable rate (e.g., not less than half the median income), or-more
generally still-for rights against excessive or unnecessary inequality
of wealth or income. But as long as one is asking what Rawls has to
contribute to the promotion of welfare rights that are justiciablethat is, susceptible of convincing recognition and enforcement by
officers acting subject to the restraints of judicial office-the special
focus on insurance rights seems at least provisionally in order. However strange may seem the nomination of welfare insurance rights as
early candidates for direct judicial recognition as components of, say,
due process or equal protection, most of us will feel intuitively that
constitutional minimum-income rights are less likely still.' 8 A like tactical preference for insurance rights may seem less clear-cut when
1' The names of Aristotle, Kant, J.S. Mill, and Sidgwick are especially prominent.
For a discussion of Rawls' affirmance of this liberal tradition, see McBride, Social
Theory Sub Specie Aeternitatis: A New Perspective, 81 YALE L.. 980, 987-90, 993-95
(1972).

9o An example of a proposed inclusion of welfare guaranties in a state constitution
appears in Morris, New Horizons For a State Bill of Rights, 45 WAsH. L. Rav. 474, 490
(1970):
Art. XXVII. State Responsibility To Protect Social And Economic Rights. The
State of Washington through its legislature and other divisions of government
shall foster the health and welfare of its citizens, through a partnership of public
agencies and voluntary organizations wherever practicable, by providing: care
for the helpless, the needy, and the sick; protection against physical and mental
illness; conditions encouraging maximum realization of the individual's independence; freedom from discrimination, unemployment, and the anxieties of
old age; personal safety; and decent housing, recreation facilities and aesthetic
surroundings.
17 See, e.g., Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 1IRv. L. REv. 7, 14-16 (1969). The cited article should be compared with the vigorous criticism of it found in Winter, supra note 7.
18 See Michelman, supra note 17, at 14.
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constitutional amendment is the chosen avenue of reform (and a
minimum-income guaranty, once ensconced in a constitution, need by
no means be less justiciable than a guaranty of, say, "decent shelter");
but I believe there are reasons why insurance rights might be more
attractive than minimum income rights to devotees of constitutional
amendment. These reasons will emerge from subsequent discussion. 19
None of the above is to assert finally that justiciable welfare
rights are a good thing, and certainly not to deny that "rights" may
be recognized and made influential in societal affairs otherwise than
through adjudication. It is simply that the task I have chosen is to
see what can be learned of Rawls by searching in his book for justiciable welfare rights. Like any other heuristic device, this one will have
to be judged by its results. And, of course, it is just possible that the
experience of the search will teach us something about whether
justiciable welfare rights ought to be pursued at all.
Numerous questions, arising in various perspectives and at various
levels, stand between us and a final appraisal of what, if anything,
Rawls' theory has to contribute to a legal conception of justiciable
welfare rights. It may help at this point to chart these questions in
their broadest outlines.
To begin with, we have to note that Rawls is mainly concerned
with what he calls "ideal theory"-the selection, defense, and working
out of principles of justice for and in the supposed context of a society
which is "well-ordered" or in a state of "near justice." The crucial
assumption of ideal theory is that the principles of justice (whatever
ones are under examination) are generally and explicitly acknowledged,
accepted, and on the whole applied in the society. It is on that assumption that the implications and consequences of the principles are worked
out and appraised.
This feature of Rawls' work immediately suggests a major division for our exploration. We should first try to discover whether and
to what extent the ideal theory itself (that is, the theory as worked
out for a society supposed to be well-ordered by the very criteria it
implies) suggests welfare rights that are judicially enforceable. But
we must then consider whether our society is well-ordered (or potentially well-ordered) in the indicated sense, and if not, what then
follows. For a theory which suggests justiciable welfare rights for a
society which is well-ordered might lead to different conclusions for
one which is not. Conversely, and perhaps more important, it may
19 See text accompanying notes 120-21 infra.
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turn out that even if the theory does not indicate justiciable welfare
rights under ideal conditions, it suggests them as a way of coping with
nonideal conditions.
Focusing, then, on ideal theory, we encounter a second major
division of inquiry. We want to know, of course, whether the principles
of justice have a substantive content which points to welfare rights
and, if so, what specific shape these rights might take; but we need
to ask also whether the theory contemplates that any such rights would
be set forth in a written constitution and (a different though related
question) whether they would be enforceable in the face of legislative
failure by judicial review. The same duality of "substance" and "procedure" will help organize our pursuit of the theory into its nonideal
applications.
Lurking behind all this is still another major inquiry. Even if
we decide that Rawls' theory suggests, for our society (well-ordered
or not as the case may be), the constitutionalization and judicial enforcement of welfare rights, we shall have to consider what claims
this theory might have to govern or influence the decisions of our
judges. This last question-whether, how, or why Professor Rawls'
Theory of Justice, any more or less than Mr. Herbert Spencer's
Social Statics,2 0 is to become an operative force in constitutional adjudication-will be explored in the last part of this essay.
I.

A.

IDEAL THEORY

Substantive Content

1. The Notion of the Basic Structure
One must consider first the level of generality at which Rawls
formulates his theory of justice as fairness. That theory proposes to
address only
the basic structure of society, or more exactly, the way in
which the major social institutions distribute fundamental
rights and duties and determine the division of advantages
from social cooperation ....

The intuitive notion here is that

this structure contains various social positions and that men
born into different positions have different expectations of life
determined, in part, by the political system as well as by
economic and social circumstances ....
It is these inequalities
•.. to which the principles of justice must in the first instance

apply. These principles, then, regulate the choice of a politi20

See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74, 75 (1905)

(Holmes,

J.,

dissenting).
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cal constitution
and the main elements of the economic and
2
social system. 1

The notion of the basic structure may be crucial to the welfare-rights
search, for it contains what may be the most persuasive line of response to the most compelling line of objection to welfare rights, that
such rights signify redistribution from the prudent and industrious
to those who have culpably failed to grasp opportunities to provide
for their own security. The notion of the basic structure suggests the
possibility that society now contains a correctible shortage of economically secure positions (or an excess of insecure ones); and welfare rights
can then be appraised as a possible corrective device.
At the same time, the focus of justice as fairness on the basic
structure may pose difficulties for the welfare-rights search. This
focus means that the theory's principles of justice are selected for
their capacity to serve as rather abstract, broad-gauged constraints
against which to test more specific and circumstantially contingent
proposals at the constitutional and legislative levels. And insofar as
the recognition and specific content of welfare rights may, within
these constraints, vary according to societal circumstances and how
other available choices (regarding the basic structure) are made, a
justiciable catalogue of welfare rights cannot directly appear. One
might, though, be rather strongly and clearly implied once the relevant
circumstances and other choices for our particular society are revealed and plugged in. This is the possibility we must pursue.
2. Managing the Tension Between Liberty and Equality
It is no longer possible to avoid an attempt, however lame, to
expound in some way the substance of the theory we are to explore.
I shall do this by examining a question which is peripherally relevant
to my main inquiry here, and of some general interest: the way the
theory manages the familiar tension between liberty and equality.
Now creditable handling of this issue involves either resolution of the
tension or, admitting that the tension cannot be resolved, refinement
(or clarification) of our understanding of the problem. A resolving
theory would show that there is no true conflict, that the ends connoted
by "liberty" and "equality" are perfectly reconcilable with each other
and fully achievable within the same social order; or else it would
resolve such irreconcilable conflict as must be admitted by ranking
the ends hierarchically, not permitting subordinate ones to impede
21 RAwLS

7.
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full achievement of superior ones. A refining theory, on the other hand,
would frankly accept a relationship marked by continuing equilibration, shifting readjustment, at most an endlessly dialectical sort of
"progress" towards ultimate settlement. A refining theory may positively value such a tense relationship as a source of social dynamism
and resilience, but it need not.22
As a starting point of our examination of Rawls' handling of the
liberty-versus-equality issue, let us examine his principles of justice,
arrayed in the "lexical" order he prescribes ;'
First principle:

Maximum equal civil and political ("basic") rights and liberties.

22
With regard to the question of distributive shares, one sort of resolving theory
would be an anarchistic one which simply forbids interference with maximum mutual
liberties of acquisition and trade for redistributive purposes. A contrasting type would
be a communistic one which demands as much interference with such liberty as is necessary to achieve perfect equality of after-tax incomes. Utilitarianism, as usually understood, belongs in the refining category. Utilitarianism is, to be sure, characterized by a
"teleological" structure in which "the good is defined independently from the right," and
then the right is defined as that which maximizes the good, id. 24. But the good to be
maximized in utilitarianism is not usually identified as either liberty or equality; both
are treated as subordinate items to be optimally mixed, subject to contingencies, in the
overriding interest of some other, perhaps hedonistic, "greatest good." Most obviously
excluded from the resolving class are "intuitionist" theories-those which hold "that
there is an irreducible family of first principles [such as liberty and equality] which
have to be weighed against one another by asking ourselves which balance, in our considered judgment, is the most just," and that "there exist no higher-order constructive
criteria for determining" the proper balance. Id. 34.
23 The "lexical" or "serial" ordering "means that a departure from the institutions

of equal liberty required by the first principle cannot be justified . .

.

. or compen-

sated for, by greater social and economic advantages. The distribution of wealth and
income, and the hierarchies of authority,, must be consistent with both the liberties of
equal citizenship and equality of opportunity." Id. 61. The full, definitive statement of
the principles is as follows:
First Principle
Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system
of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.
Second Principle
Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are
both:
(a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged,

. .

.and

(b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of
fair equality of opportunity.
FirstPriority Rule (The Priority of Liberty)
The principles of justice are to be ranked in lexical order and therefore
liberty can be restricted only for the sake of liberty. There are two cases:
(a) a less extensive liberty must strengthen the total system of liberty
shared by all;
(b) a less than equal liberty must be acceptable to those with the
lesser liberty.
Second Priority Rule (The Priority of Justice over Efficiency and Welfare)
The second principle of justice is lexically prior to the principle of efficiency and to that of maximizing the sum of advantages; and fair opportunity is prior to the difference principle. ...
(a) an inequality of opportunity must enhance the opportunities of
those with the lesser opportunity ....

Id. 302-03.
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Second principle:
A.
B.

Fair equality of opportunity;
Only such social and economic inequalities as work for the benefit of the worstoff position (the "difference principle").

Working backward from observed social and economic inequalities, the total effect can be stated this way: such inequalities are permissible (indeed, desired) if, but only if (1) the arrangements
generating them work out better for the worst-off position defined by
those arrangements than would any more equal structure (the "difference principle"); (2) the various positions defined by the arrangements are formally open to all and "fair equality of opportunity"
(particularly including some amount of compensatory education) is
provided (the "opportunity principle" 24); and (3) in any event the
civil and political "basic" rights and liberties of citizens are equal and
as extensive as possible consistent with this condition of mutuality
(the "liberty principle").
Although Rawls' emphasis on the ordering of the two principles
might suggest he is arguing for some kind of resolution under which
liberty dominates equality, and although, conversely, some critics
seem to read him as a "resolver" for whom equality dominates liberty 5
(and some passages in the book do suggest such a reading26), the
truth appears to be that Rawls offers refinement, not resolution, of
the liberty-equality tension. His difference principle27 is, to be sure, not
intuitionist,28 for it asserts a unitary constructive criterion for appraising distributive outcomes; and it is not utilitarian, for that unitary
criterion cares not for maximization across an entire social order of
some universal good. But the difference principle, I believe, has in
common with both intuitionist and utilitarian theories an acceptance
of a tense dynamic relationship between liberty and equality which
24
25

"Opportunity principle" is my tag-line, not Rawls'.
E.g., Bell, supra note 5; Kristol, About Equality, COindMNTARY, Nov. 1972, at

41.
26For example, Rawls says: "The naturally advantaged are not to gain merely
because they are more gifted, but only to cover the costs of training and education and
for using their endowments in ways that help the less fortunate as well." RAwLs 101-02
A similar statement is found at id. 158. If Rawls means that the "naturally advantaged" are not to receive any extra income except what would cover training costs and
"hazard pay," he would indeed be a radical equalizer. But taking the book as a whole and
all passages in context, it seems to me that Rawls means to justify a much broader notion
of incentive and that he is prepared to accept quite substantial inequalities as a result.
He is explicit as to the latter point, id. 158.
27
Paragraph (a) of The Second Principle, note 23 supra.
2For Rawls' definition of intuitionism, see note 22 supra.
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is highly sensitive to contingent circumstances.29 This interpretation,
if correct, can certainly be expected to bear upon the difference principle's capacity to generate justiciable welfare rights."
In suggesting that the difference principle accepts a continuing
relationship of tension between liberty and equality, I have in mind
especially that part of liberty associated with rights of propertywith getting, keeping, and disposing over the use and enjoyment of
things of value. This aspect of liberty is perhaps most obviously in
potential conflict with equality. A crucial question, then, is: do the
lexically preferred civil and political ("basic") liberties include those
of acquiring, keeping, enjoying, and transmitting property? Perhaps
surprisingly, Rawls never seems to answer this question explicitly.3 '
But perhaps it is enough for us to see that an unqualified lexical preference for such acquisitive and retentive liberties would imply an
anarchistic resolution totally subverting the opportunity and difference principles by forbidding the taxation needed to carry them out32
which cannot be what Rawls means.
29 When Rawls states that "the two-part basic structure [i.e., the bifurcated statement of the two principles and the First Priority Rule, note 23 supra] allows a reconciliation of liberty and equality," RAwIS 204, he seems to be addressing himself to a
different, and less baffling, question: how citizens can be "equal before the law" (as we
might say) even as the law allows substantial inequalities of position, power, income
and 3wealth.
0
See text accompanying notes 43-72 infra. It should be noted at this point that
the difference principle offers a test and not a prescription. With respect to it, Rawls says:
"Often the best that we can say of a law or policy is that it is at least not clearly unjust." RAwLs 199.
31
Rawls defines the basic liberties as follows:
The basic liberties of citizens are, roughly speaking, political liberty (the right
to vote and to be eligible for public office) together with freedom of speech and
assembly; liberty of conscience and freedom of thought; freedom of the person
along with the right to hold (personal) property; and freedom from arbitrary
arrest and seizure as defined by the concept of the rule of law.
RAwLs 61. The qualifier "(personal)" is, in context, evidently meant to exclude at least
the means of production and so recognize that socialist schemes may be just. The
"right to hold" admits easily of regulation and taxation insofar as they are designed
"to prevent concentrations of power detrimental to the fair value [.e., effective equality]
of political liberty," id. 277, since the lexically preferred first principle calls for "an
equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with
a similar system of liberty for all," id. 302 (emphasis added), so that some basic liberties
may be restricted for the sake of others, id. 203-04. But taxation to satisfy the opportunity and difference principles (which Rawls explicitly contemplates, id. 277-79) would
seemingly violate the First Priority Rule, note 23 supra, unless "(personal) property"
(as included among the lexically preferred "basic liberties") means only those possessions required for individual human functioning.
32
If,on the other hand, the opportunity and difference principles are to be saved
from such extinction by reading basic liberties as not to encompass property claims, we
must be sure that no trouble of a different sort ensues when we try to grasp the true
operative significance of the proposed lexical ordering. It seems that in contexts which
come readily to mind, the ordering's force will be exhausted by ranking both the liberty
and opportunity principles as superior to the difference principle, saying that both
liberty and opportunity must be assured before any residual inequalities, even those
satisfying the difference principle, are permitted. It clearly means something to say that
the liberty principle is lexically prior to the difference principle, even if property rights
are not a part of liberty. For it might happen that rather extreme social and economic
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Let us now introduce some terms not used by Rawis and incorporate them in a more complete statement of the second principle. Let
us use "occupational liberty" to mean freedom in choice of productive
activity, and "dispositive liberty" to mean freedom to dispose over
the proceeds (these two liberties together comprising a notion of
"proprietary" liberty or "property rights"). Then the "two" principles of justice might read as follows (with all principles and subprinciples ranked in the order given):
First principle:
A. Liberty principle (maximum equal civil,
political, and occupational liberties).
Second principle:
B. Opportunity principle.
C. Difference principle.
D. Disposition principle (dispositive liberties to be respected).
This statement would make clear that when the opportunity or
difference principles collide (as they must) with the dispositive aspect
of proprietary liberty, it is the latter which must give way. At the
same time, by revealing proprietary liberty (including the disposition
aspect) as itself a principle of justice, the statement makes clear that
the opportunity and difference principles are not unrestrained counsels
of levellism.
inequalities would lead to greater income for the worst-off than a more equal arrangement, but that such an extreme degree of inequality would undermine effective equality
of political and civil rights; and in that case the lexical priority of liberty would mean
that the more equal arrangement is required even at some sacrifice in income for the
worst-off. See note 31 supra. Likewise, the lexical priority of the opportunity principle
over the difference principle has plausible applications. Certain extremes of social and
economic inequalities might promise more income for the worst-off but only at the
cost (or possibly by the very means) of establishing a hereditary aristocracy or other
classbound social structure. Such inequalities would be forbidden. See RAwLs 74, 278,
300-01. It is harder to find operative significance in the statement that the liberty
principle is lexically prior to the opportunity principle, because (still assuming that
property claims are not a part of the preferred "liberties") it is harder to see how
these can ever come into conflict. What application can be found for the proviso in the
statement that positions are to be formally open to all under conditions of fair equality
of opportunity-provided that maximum mutual civil and political liberty is assured to
all citizens? There is, at least, the case in which someone's exercise of free speech
rights is thought to interfere with fair equality of opportunity-e.g., by expounding
a scientific theory of racial inferiority. Here the lexical ordering would apparently
forbid any curbs on speech. Another case which comes to mind is a proposal to bring
about equality of opportunity by holding back the naturally gifted. Such a tactic would
plainly be disapproved by Rawls, but the disapproval is to be found in the definition of
the concept of fair equality of opportunity, not in the priority rules. See text accompanying note 73 infra. Stili, this case suggests a possible exegetical canon which we
should keep in mind: that the priority rules, and the idea of lexical orderings, are not
to be understood in a crudely fundamentalist or vindictively literal way, but rather
to be taken more loosely as a way of lending shape and structure to the entire doctrine,
which is to remain supple and not hidebound.
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Suppose we have arrived at a set of arrangements affording fair
equality of opportunity and satisfying the difference principle in the
minimal sense that no reduction in inequality will improve the lot of
the disadvantaged. In this region the fine tuning seems most naturally
to take the form of taxation of the best- (or better-) off representative
person ("the top") in order to transfer the proceeds to the worst(or worse-) off representative person ("the bottom"). To say that the
difference principle is minimally satisfied means that the top has already been pared down, and the bottom already lifted, by such taxes
and transfers to the point where the disincentive effect of a further
increment of taxation will reduce GNP by just enough to offset the
bottom's increased relative share, so that the bottom's absolute situation will remain unchanged. Now suppose that there is some appreciable range over which addititional taxation could further pare down
the top without lowering the bottom or raising it, but making the distribution more equalY3 The suggested insertion of a "disposition principle" into the hierarchy of principles of justice means that in this case
Rawls would prefer the less equal distribution-that is, the one which,
ceteris paribus, maximizes dispositive liberty. Various considerations
can be marshalled to show that this is indeed what Rawls means.
With regard to distribution of shares, respect for dispositive
liberty is equivalent to adherence to the criterion of efficiency or
Pareto-optimality 3 4 Both would protect the top from transfers designed to reduce inequality, without raising the bottom's absolute
level. Rawls is explicit that efficiency is a proper criterion of choice
between distributions which are in all other relevant respects similar; 3
33 The discussion at this point ignores the possible interactions between the bottom's
relative situation and its absolute situation: that is, it disregards the possibility that
further paring down of the top will bring net improvement to the bottom's situation,
even while it fails to raise the bottom's real money income, because it alleviates "relative deprivation" effects. It seems justifiable to consider cases in which no such phenomenon occurs, wholly apart from any possible doubts about the reality of relative
deprivation. These cases may arise either because within the range of additional transfers we have in mind-those which will not lower the bottom's real money income-no
noticeable alleviation of relative deprivation will occur (i.e., there are discontinuities in
the function relating the intensity of tax-transfer activity to the magnitude of relativedeprivation effects); or because, assuming no such discontinuities, there is a range of
tax-transfer increments within which reduction of the bottom's real money income
will be just offset by reduction of relative deprivation. The problem of'relative deprivation is further considered at note 57 infra & accompanying text, and at text accompanying notes 68-70 infra.
34 [A] configuration is efficient whenever it is impossible to change it so as to
make some persons (at least one) better off without at the same time making
other persons (at least one) worse off. Thus a distribution . . . among certain
individuals is efficient if there exists no redistribution ... that improves the
circumstances of at least one of these individuals without another being disadvantaged.
RAwLs 67.
3D See id,66-72.
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and Rawls' argument and statement of the principles, taken altogether,
indicate rather strongly that increments of inequality do not, in and of
themselves, constitute relevant counter-arguments. 3 6
This reading is indirectly bolstered by its consistency with a
number of factors in the total argument, including: (1) the intuitive
argument for choosing the difference principle in the original position,
which relies on probabilistic appraisal of alternatives, conditioned by
special sensitivity to downside risk;3 7 (2) the emphasis given the contention that envy should be disregarded in constructing this choice;"
(3) the strong intimations that there is positive moral value in allowing
distribution to be as much as possible a matter of "pure procedural
justice, 3 9 together with (4) the clearly expressed preference for occupational liberty;4" and (5) the textual irresolution, noted above,
concerning the inclusion of property rights in the lexically preferred
basic liberties.41
In sum, the Rawlsian ethic calls for inequalities to be reduced to
a point, but also to be allowed (even favored) to a point. The subprinciples of the second principle of justice, taken all together, can
only be called a set of precepts for adjusting tension between equality
and proprietary liberty-tension which is not about to disappear. At
this particular value-frontier, there is no effective lexical ordering. The
precepts of the second principle, while they may well strike us as a
compelling way of accommodating proprietary liberty with an adequate
notion of human moral equality, do all the same compose a mode of
accommodation, not of resolution. 42 We should not be surprised, then,
36

See note 23 supra. Note especially paragraph (a) of the Second Principle and
the first clause of the Second Priority Rule.
The following statement of the difference principle suggests that Rawls would
favor additional taxation which would lower the top without raising the bottom: "[T]he
higher expectations of those better situated are just if and only if they work as part of a
scheme which improves the expectations of the least advantaged members of society."
RAwILs 75 (emphasis added). But that statement should be compared with the following definition of Rawls' principle of efficiency, which suggests that Rawls would oppose
such transfers:
[Ain arrangement of rights and duties . . .is efficient if and only if it is impossible .. .to redefine the scheme of rights and duties, so as to raise the expectations of any representative man ... without at the same time lowering the
expectations of some . . . other representative man.

Id. 70 (emphasis added).
37 Compare id. 152-54 with id. 164-66.
s8AId. 143-44, 538.
39 d.83-88, 274-75.
401d. 272-73, 276.
41
Text accompanying note 31 supra.

42
The Second Principle expresses a rather sophisticated notion of the moral equality
of mankind. See RAws 504-12. Accidents of birth and natural endowment being, in this
view, morally irrelevant, social institutions are to be designed so as to allow nature's
endowments of ability to work for the good of all, not just for the good of the gifted.
Id. 100-04; see also id. 74-75. One might be tempted to say that the opportunity and
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if these precepts are indeterminate and debatable in their contingent
applications.
3. Welfare Implications of Justice as Fairness
We turn now to a more specific search for the welfare-rights
implications of the principles of justice. It will be convenient to consider separately the difference principle, the opportunity principle, and
the liberty principle in that order. Eventually we shall have to consider
the meaning and bearing of the theory as a whole.
a. The Difference Principle
Within the general framework of a free-market system, the difference principle is said to imply a claim on behalf of each person to a
Csocial minimum" which must be provided in order that the residual
market determination of distributive shares may be considered just.
Although this claim could perhaps be satisfied, partly if not wholly, by
legislative creation of insurance rights concerning minimum levels of
service to such needs as subsistence, health, and the like, it seems at
least equally satisfiable by general monetary transfer schemes such as
negative income taxes. 3 Even if the latter method is preferred, it seems
worth considering whether the dollar value of the minimum (most
likely expressed as a rate of income) might be shown to depend on, or
reflect, which particular needs are to be covered and at what levels.
If so, it may be possible to construct constitutional insurance rights
out of the "social minimum" conception. If not, the difference principle's welfare-rights implications will be exhausted by a minimumincome claim which, I have suggested,' will tend to be less justiciable
than a set of insurance rights.
Our study of the difference principle's insurance-rights implications will proceed in the following way. We shall first pursue the matter
on the assumption that the bottom's prospects (which the difference
principle requires to be maximized) are to be defined in terms only
difference principles, serially coupled, are indeed a kind of definition of what Rawls
means by the statement that persons are "equal." These coupled principles might be
seen as the operationalized expression of his moral notion of equality as applicable to
social institutions. This interpretation gains support from Rawis' willingness to entertain the idea that a suitably restricted version of the difference principle might justify
inequalities in the political structure. See text accompanying notes 110-17 infra. Yet he
flatly rejects the application of the difference and opportunity principles to the distribution of the most basic liberties of all, those of conscience. As to these, he calls for
absolute mutuality and will not be content with institutions which would claim to have
confirmed moral equality in principle by in practice maintaining unequal liberties supposed to maximize the liberties of the less free. RAwLS 206-09.
43 See RAwLs 275. Rawls' notion of "primary goods" and his related strictures regarding paternalism suggest reasons why monetary transfers might be preferred. See
note 11 supra; note 142 infra.
44 Text accompanying notes 17-18 supra.
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of the primary social goods of income and wealth (rights and liberties
evidently being taken care of by the liberty principle). On this assumption we shall compare the difference principle with that of average
utility (which Rawls plainly regards as the difference principle's
most plausible competitor 45) to see which is more receptive to a notion
of welfare insurance rights. We shall then ask whether, under the
difference principle, the bottom's expectations are to be maximized
also with regard to the primary social good of self-respect or "a sense
of one's own worth" (the most important primary good of all, as
Rawls ultimately says); and if so, what difference this makes.
If we were working up a taxonomy of distributive-share precepts,
one of the classifying traits we might well use would be the representative standpoint from which the distribution is regarded. For the
difference principle, this is the worst-off representative person, what
we have been calling the bottom. For the principle of average utility
it would be the middle, or, assuming constant population, the whole.4 6
Another, and intersecting, distinction for distributive-share precepts
might be that between precepts which are maximizing and those which
are "satisficing" :47 Does the precept take the view that "more is better,"
or rather that "enough is enough"? This may seem a potentially fruitful distinction for our inquiry insofar as a highly articulated (that is,
justiciable) conception of insurance rights may seem to fit more naturally under a satisficing than a maximizing precept. Now a precept
such as average utility, which views things from the standpoint of the
middle or the whole must in strict logic be a maximizing one, while a
precept which views things from the standpoint of the bottom may
seem more likely to be satisficing.48 It might, therefore, seem as though
the difference principle would be more likely than average utility to
point the way to an insurance-rights package. But of course the difference principle is itself maximizing, not satisficing; speaking for the
bottom, it says that more is better 9 And the curious truth turns out
45

See RAWLS 161-66.
46 Rawls' definition of average utility is more refined but leads to the same thing:
To apply this conception to the basic structure, institutions are set up so as to
maximize the percentage weighted sum of the expectations of representative
individuals. To compute this sum we multiply expectations by the fraction of
society at the corresponding position.
Id. 162.
47See H. SIMoN, MODELS OF MAN: SocAL AND RATIONAL 261, 270-71 (1957).
48 If the precept is concerned only with satisfaction of minimum standards or requirements, and indifferent to variations above the minimum, it has adopted the bottom's
standpoint. (If it is the precept of absolute equality, under which the minimum is also
the maximum, the distinction between the two standpoints simply becomes irrelevant.)
49 This is clearly correct for the difference principle in isolation. That it is not,
however, a correct statement when applied to justice as fairness, as a whole set of
principles regarded from the original position, will become important later on. See text
accompanying notes 77-80 infra.
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to be that average utility is the more amenable of the two precepts to
constructing an argument for social insurance focused on particular
needs, because it is not tied to a short list of general social goods such
as income and wealth and, accordingly, allows for much more latitude
and specificity in making assumptions about what people really want
and need. And yet, as we shall see, the very considerations underlying
this conclusion also show that the average-utility argument for insurance-rights is not an argument for "rights" at all in the sense that
concerns us, but merely an argument for social expediency; and it is
precisely for the reason that average utility is concerned with expediency
rather than rights that Rawls rejects it as a guiding principle.
The difference principle asks whether the tax-transfer structure,
with its associated incentive structure, can be altered so as to improve
the situation of the bottom. 50 The average-utility principle asks whether
any possible alteration can increase total consumer satisfaction (assuming no change in population).r" For average utility, at least, a
notion of "basic needs" might be relevant insofar as we make certain
assumptions about the relationships between the intensity of a person's
desire for additional quanta of certain goods and the "amounts" of
those goods he already has. These assumptions, indeed, are but variations and refinements of the asumption of "declining marginal utility
of income" which utilitarians commonly make in arguing for some
degree of income-equalizing tax-transfer activity. 5 They posit that
persons now enjoying little or none of certain goods would be willing
to pay, for certain increments to their existing low levels of enjoyment,
amounts exceeding production costs by more than the normal market
rate of profit.5

3

Borrowing from economic jargon, we might call this

5

oSee text accompanying note 33 supra. Treating tax-transfer arrangements as the
only component to be manipulated may be an oversimplification, since even if these arrangements are optimal for the bottom, given the rest of the basic structure as it stands, some
possible alteration of other sectors of the basic structure, or some general revision of the
structure itself might improve the bottom's situation. I am simply assuming, subject to
further investigation, that if even the oversimplified inquiry made here fails to yield
justiciable welfare rights, they would not be derivable by a more complex inquiry, entailing still
further debatable choices.
51
See note 46 supra.
52For an elaboration and criticism of the notion of declining marginal utility of
income, see W. BLum & H. KALvEN, Tna UNEAsy CASE FOR PRoGREssiE TAxAT N 56-63

(1953).
53 Let a, b, c and d stand for progressively higher levels of enjoyment of some
good. If a is a very low level, b is barely adequate, and c rather high, the value of b
minus a may greatly exceed that of d minus c, even though there are plausible scales (e.g.,
production costs or physical quantities) under which the two differences are the same.
Indeed, there may be no increment to a which has the same value as any increment to c.
Increments to a which are smaller than b minus a may all be virtually worthless, and
increments to a at least equal to b minus a, of great value; whereas increments to a seem
always to have some marginal value but never as much as b minus a. Consider all this
in the case of food (allowing increments to reflect improvements not only of quantity
but of mix, variety, quality, refinement of preparation, rarity, delicacy, etc.).
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excess a (Cconsumeris surplus" arising under nondiscriminatory pricing
when dollars are spent to satisfy urgent needs arising out of deprivations, absolute or relative, not widely experienced in the economy.5
Income transfers from the top to the bottom which enable the
bottom to cover the costs of such high-surplus increments would, even
allowing for disincentive effects which reduce total material output,
seem likely to raise the total of consumer satisfaction; and if so, such
transfers would be required by average utility. 5 One can imagine
trying to specify for any given economy a critical list of minimum
service levels regarding certain needs, such that the anti-productive
effects of intensified tax-transfer activity required to enable the bottom
to cover the costs of this basic set would be just offset by the welfare
gained through shifting resources to the satisfaction of these hitherto
unmet basic needs. This would be the point where total consumer
satisfaction is at its maximum and average utility is content. Through
this line of thought it is at least conceivable that under average-utility
reasoning a social minimum could be exhaustively defined or calculated by reference to the costs of satisfying a basic set of minimum
levels of service to particular needs. 56
Of course this will seem an outrageously impractical recipe for
calculating a complete social minimum, especially considering that
5
4 See A. TAsr.L , PRINCIPLEs op EcoxomAIcs 124 (1890) ; Hicks, The Rehabilitation
of Consumers' Surplus, 9 REv. EcoN. STu-IEs 108 (1941), reprinted in READINGs IN
NVELrAA EcoNoicS 325 (K. Arrow & T. Scitovsky eds. 1969).
55 This ignores the claims of future generations and the associated notion of a "just
savings principle," discussed at RAwLs 284-93. Like the oversimplification discussed in
note 50 supra, this oversimplification seems allowable in view of our inquiry's limited
purpose.
GSAmong the qualifications and refinements required for full development of the
foregoing argument, the following may be briefly noted:
First, to be precise we ought to speak of basic packages of inferrelated needs and
service levels, rather than collections of mutually independent basic needs and levels. The
statement that I would give everything I had in return for treatment of my tuberculosis
breaks down if all I have is just enough to eat. A more precise statement might be that
I would give all I had to be both cured and fed. Again, how much shelter (in the
form of artificial heat) I deem essential may depend on what diet and clothing are available to me; and how much education I deem essential might depend on what level of
subsistence is assured me in any event. Thus there seem to be various sets of value-interchangeable basic packages. Cf. Tribe, supra note 6, at 91-92. It would seem that in looking
for that package whose provision will satisfy average utility we should focus on that
package in each such set which is cheapest to produce.
Second, the discussion applies only to needs which in normal course would be
satisfied by the expenditure of money. It has no obvious application to "goods" which
normally one already has when born, such as limbs and organs; or to "goods" which are
not materially costly to produce, such as bodily freedom and privacy. A discussion which
may be plausible in regard to the former sort of goods may well seem bizarre when
applied to the others.
Third, I believe that the notion of basic needs developed here is at least remotely
akin to notions of rights being cultivated by professors Tribe, supra note 6, and Charles
Fried (in an unpublished paper). The notions have in common the supposition of "lumpiness" and "groupiness" in the exchange schedules ("indifference curves") which show how
an individual would trade off (or decline to trade off) various increments of some goods
against various increments of others.
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the contents of the basic set of needs must undergo continuing redefinition to keep abreast of changes in total output, distribution,
social practice, and "tastes. ' 5 7 And even disregarding its impracticality,
what has been described is only a method for calculating a minimum,
not a method for delivering it. While the calculation is hinged to
specific needs, delivery might well be in unrestricted cash. The calculation proceeds from general assumptions about most people's perceptions of their basic economic priorities; but even if one thought
that such general assumptions might be accurate enough to provide
the best available approach to calculating the universal social minimum guaranty that would maximize total consumer satisfaction, one
might still choose to make some or all distributions in cash so as to
avoid unnecessary sacrifices of welfare in the cases of recipients whose
actual priorities vary from those of the general model.
Given the difficulties of calculation, the elusive and presumptuous
nature of the necessary suppositions, and the possible wastefulness of
in-kind distribution, it seems unlikely that utilitarians would try to
compose their entire social minimum by packaging various constitutional insurance rights. Yet some select members of the basic set of
needs might seem so obviously universal and durable as to warrant
recognition as insurance rights, were it not for the fundamental problem of principle already mentioned: under average-utility notions,
transfers (no matter how calculated) are undertaken for the sake of
a maximizing interest ascribed to the populace as a whole, and not
for the sake of any acknowledged claim of justice or right on the
part of the disadvantaged claimant as such. This being so, it is quite
unclear why any policy favoring such transfers should be advanced
in the guise of "rights"-meaning demands that are to be met despite
an opposing legislative will-especially when it is supposed, as in
"ideal theory," that the legislature is the authentic voice of a morally
enlightened population.58
5
7The idea that "minimum" levels of service to particular needs, below which a
special sense of deprivation will arise, might depend on levels which prevail generally in
the society need not rest on any un-Rawsian notions about envy. (For Rawls' treatment
of envy, see RAwLs 143-44, 538.) Some needs--education is an obvious example-may
have intrinsically competitive aspects. But beyond that, needs are subject to influence by
acculturative factors quite discrete from envy. See McBride, supra note 15, at 998-99.
These factors do not exert their influence only though psychic channels. A commonplace
illustration concerns one's "need" for an automobile. Where private automobile ownership
is prevalent, it may be expected that (1) general land-use patterns will reflect such
prevalent ownership in a way that tends to increase distances between most residential
areas and most work places, and (2) political pressure for social investment in public
transportation will be depleted. Thus a private car may become, in practice, a critical
factor in employability and in general mobility.
58 See text accompanying notes 90-98 infra.
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More than anything else, what appears to distinguish the difference principle from that of average utility is that the former does
establish distributive claims for the disadvantaged to press on their
own behalf, and not simply as happenstance advocates for the general
public interest. And so one turns to the possibility of extending the
"basic set" method of defining and calculating a social minimum, or
part of it, to the minimum implied by the difference principle. But
this, it turns out, cannot be done. One can say that the differenceprinciple social minimum must be at least as large as the averageutility social minimum, because all changes designed to achieve the
latter minimum must increase the bottom's income and all such changes
are required by the difference principle. 9 But this is not at all the
same thing as saying that the difference-principle minimum could ever
be calculated, even in part, by asking what particular needs the bottom
was able to satisfy at various income levels. The special relevance of
basic needs for average utility is that the abnormally high consumer's
surplus they imply can overbalance the antiproductive effects of
tax-induced disincentives so as to yield a net increase in total consumer satisfaction. But increases in consumer satisfaction, as such,
hold no interest for the difference principle. That principle simply
pursues any increase in the bottom's income, whether or not large
enough to yield a net rise in consumer satisfaction in the face of tax
increases and associated incentive and production losses. Incometransfer activity is simply to be intensified just up to the point where
any further intensification lowers total output so much that the bottom's absolute income begins to fall even as its relative share of total
consumer satisfaction continues to rise. Under the difference principle,
that is all there is to it. There can be no implicit insurance-rights
package because there is no concern for what the bottom spends (or is
able to spend) its income on. Income is income-a primary, an elemental, social good, of which the bottom simply wants and is entitled
to as much as it can get.
So we have arrived at this point: Under average utility there is
a difficult argument for relating a social minimum to basic needs
(or articulating a minimum in terms of social insurance for basic
needs), but no argument for erecting the minimum so conceived into
a constitutional right; whereas under the difference principle a right
is surely implied, but it is a (less justiciable) income right rather
than a (more justiciable) set of insurance rights.
59 This reflects the "maximin" rationale for preferring the difference principle over
average utility in the original position. RAwLs 152-56.

982

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 121:.962

Even apart from the quest for justiciability, the position under
the difference principle is unsatisfactory. A precept for the distribution

of material social goods which ignores claims regarding basic needs
as such, and is sensitive only to claims regarding money income, will
for many of us seem incomplete and thus not fully in harmony with

our "considered judgments."6 And there are surface indications that
this is true for Rawls himself, for his own references to the size of the
social minimum equivocate between emphasis on needs and emphasis
on holding down inequality.6 (One comes away with the impression
that the minimum is to be set with a view both to assuring fulfillment
of certain relatively basic needs and to accomplishing a desired, but
highly contingent and ineffable, degree of income equalization.) We
are obliged, then, to consider whether we have pressed the inquiry
far enough.
60
It may be asked how anyone's considered judgments can be offended by a
principle that demands the maximum possible income for the bottom, merely because
that principle exhibits no concern for satisfying any particular needs the bottom may
be supposed to have. If certain needs remain unsatisfied even after the difference principle
is satisfied, nothing more can be done to meet them. How, then, can considered judgments
be offended?
The answer is that a considered judgment is composed not only of a conclusion
regarding the rightness of a given act or outcome, but also of a reason or reasons, however indistinct or inarticulate, for that conclusion. I further suggest that the reasons may
have practical importance not only in indicating what is to be done in the particular
case (if the conclusion is that correction is required), but also in conditioning our more
general response to situations of that type.
Suppose a number of persons are seen to have incomes so low that they cannot
obtain basic health care. Two observers might agree that the situation demands correction, but disagree about the reasons. The first may say that the observed inability of
some persons to obtain health care out of private income is strong evidence that the
difference principle is being violated. It is hard to know what remedial action he could
demand except that the legislature, with such economic-policy advice as it can garner,
immediately consider whether the bottom's income might not be raised by some means
consistent with the liberty and opportunity principles. The necessary analysis is likely to
prove time-consuming and complex. A decision to stand pat, on the ground that no
increase in the bottom's income is in fact possible, will almost certainly not be demonstrably wrong. The first observer could strongly believe that it is wrong, without questioning the legislature's good faith. At this point, the first observer could make no
further demands.
The second observer says that the existing situation is troubling not only because it
suggests that the bottom's income is not as high as it could be, but also because persons
are entitled not to be barred from basic health care by impecunity-recognizing as a
natural limitation that the right is exhausted once it can b shown that the bottom's
income is as high as it can possibly be, or that there is no way to free the health-care
interest from the impecunity risk without displacing that risk onto some other interest
deemed at least equally important. The second observer, then, can demand that the legislature enact a health-insurance program, and the burden of persuasion will then be on
those who disagree to show that the natural limitation supports their position.
Thus the difference in reasons given for the same conclusion may have an important
effect on attitudes with which the problem of correction is approached, and therefore on
the legislative outcome; and this possibility exists although ve assume, consistent with
the suppositions of ideal theory, that the legislature always acts in good faith.
61The "needs" factor is emphasized at RAwLS 276-77. The "equalization" factor is
apparent at id. 285-86. It should be recalled that some amount of equalizing taxation will
be undertaken for the sake of protecting fair equality of political liberty and of opportunity. Id. 277-79; note 32 supra. But this does not exclude further equalization for the
sake of the difference principle, and certainly does not make the calculus more determinate.
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An obvious place to look further is into the notion of primary
social goods. This notion's lack of articulation seemed in our discussion to play an important role in masking insurance rights out of a
difference-principle social minimum. That discussion, of course, focused
on the objective, material primary social goods of income and wealth.
Perhaps we can get where we-and evidently Rawls, as well-would
like to go by including the primary good of self-respect among those
with respect to which the bottom's prospects are to be maximized.
Rawls defines self-respect as follows:
We may define self-respect ... as having two aspects. First
of all,... it includes a person's sense of his own value, his

secure conviction that his conception of his good, his plan of
life, is worth carrying out. And second, self-respect implies
a confidence in one's ability, so far as it is within one's power,
to fulfill one's intentions. When we feel that our plans are
of little value, we cannot pursue them with pleasure or take
delight in their execution. Nor plagued by failure and selfdoubt can we continue in our endeavors. It is clear then why
self-respect is a primary good. Without it nothing may seem
worth doing, or if some things have value for us, we lack
the will to strive for them. All desire and activity becomes
empty and vain, and we sink into apathy and cynicism.
Therefore the parties in the original position would wish to
avoid at almost any cost the social conditions that undermine
self-respect. 2
I shall assume without detailed discussion that the notion of
self-respect as a moral entitlement is perfectly capable of implying
some conception of a minimum insurance-rights package. Rawls captures the essence of this view when he refers to a "psychological
condition" in which "persons lack a sure confidence in their own
value and in their ability to do anything worthwhile," and notes that
many occasions arise when this psychological condition is
experienced as painful and humiliating. The discrepancy
between oneself and others is made visible by the social
structure and style of life of one's society. The less fortunate
are therefore often forcibly reminded of their situation, sometimes leading them to an even lower estimate of themselves
and their mode of living.3
But there is initial difficulty in feeding this view into applications
of the difference principle, because by itself it does not seem to fit the
difference principle's "more is better" attitude. The self-respect ap02 RAWLS 440.
0

3Id. 535.
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proach to welfare rights most naturally seems to want to satisfy a
minimum, not to get more and more. Such a difference between income and wealth, on the one hand, and self-respect, on the other,
may be illustrated by the following graphs, in which the horizontal
axes both measure intensity of tax-transfer activity ("T") and the
vertical axes measure, respectively, the bottom's expectations regarding income ("E,") and the bottom's expectations regarding selfrespect ("E."). The relationship between T and E, is depicted by a
roof-shaped curve indicating that at lower levels of T any disincentive
effects are more than offset by the increase in the bottom's share,
while the converse is true at the higher levels of T.64 The top of the
roof is the point where E, is maximized, and the difference principle

Income
Expectation
of Bottom
(Ey)

Tax-Transfer Activity (T)
coherently requires that T be set at level T,. The relationship between
T and E can only be shown as a horizontal line beginning where T
is at level T;.65 This is the minimum T which can satisfy the income/

Self-Respect

Expectation
of Bottom
(E)

-E.

/
/

/

/

T.
Tax-Transfer Activity (T)
64 See text accompanying note 33 supra.

65 The descending tail to the left of T. is meant to allow for the plausible qualification
that there is a rather narrow, "closing-in" range of provision for the bottom's basic needs
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welfare requirements of self-respect, and any additional T, while it
might increase E. (if T, is less then T,) can have no effect on E..
Rawls states that "in applying the difference principle we wish
to include in the prospects of the least advantaged the primary good
of self-respect; and there are a variety of ways of taking account of
this value consistent with the difference principle.""0 But in fact he
intimates only one way in which self-respect might be accounted for
through application of the difference principle (though, as we shall
see, there are clearly many ways of doing so witkout contradicting
the difference principle). Raws says:
To some extent men's sense of their own worth may hinge
upon their institutional position and their income share....
[But] with the appropriate background arrangements, [the]
inclinations [to social envy and jealousy] should not be
excessive, at least not when the priority of liberty is effectively upheld. But theoretically we can if necessary include
self-respect in the primary goods, the index of which defines
expectations. Then in applications of the difference principle,
this index can allow for the effects of excusable envy [i.e.,
injuries to self-respect]; the expectations of the less advantaged are lower the more severe these effects. Whether some
adjustment for self-respect has to be made is best decided
from the standpoint of the legislative stage where the parties
have more information about social circumstances
and the
7
principle of political determination appliesY
Rawls is, however, far from persuaded that any adjustment in the
difference principle's application will ever be required in the interest
of self-respect."8 And he does not give us any direct statement of what
form such an adjustment could take. Self-respect aside, the difference
principle has already, presumably, led to the setting of T at level T,.
within which the effect is to lift the bottom's self-respect some distance, but not as high
as it might be lifted by income transfers. This possibility of a basic-needs-related selfrespect continuum seems to be recognized at RAwts 546. Elsewhere, however, Rawis
seems to differentiate self-respect, viewed as a satisficing kind of good, from income and
wealth, viewed as a maximizing kind of good. Id. 396-97, 440, 543-44.
661d. 362.
67

1d. 546.
68 A need for such adjustments also to some extent mars the structural nicety of
justice as fairness. Says Rawls:
Aln equal division of all primary goals is irrational in view of the possibility of
bettering everyone's circumstances by accepting certain inequalities. Thus the
best solution is to support the primary good of self-respect as far as possible by
the assignment of the basic liberties that can indeed be made equal, defining the
same status for all. At the same time, distributive justice as frequently understood, justice in the relative shares of material means, is relegated to a subordinate
place. Thus we arrive at another reason for factoring the social order into two
parts as indicated by the principles of justice. While these principles permit inequalities in return for contributions that are for the benefit of all, the precedence of liberty entails equality in the social bases of esteem.
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There is no way the bottom's real money income can be increased by
any adjustment of T. The only available adjustment, and the one
apparently implied by the quoted passage, is to increase T to some
level ('I) higher than T,, such that the top's standard of living has
been reduced to the point where the standard of enjoyment of basic
goods available to the bottom, although lower than that available at
Ty, is relatively high enough to confirm its self-respect. The supposition must be that insofar as self-respect may be undermined by low
standards of living, this is significantly a matter of relative deprivation.
So in suggesting that adjustments for self-respect may be required
in the course of applying the difference principle, Rawls must be supposing the possibility of cases in which T,, perhaps suprisingly, is
higher than T--in which a higher level of tax-transfer activity is
required to exhaust the possibilities of confirming the bottom's selfrespect than would maximize its income. Still, someone might argue
that T should not automatically be set at T. rather than at Tv--that
the question depends on whether the value of E. at T. (assuming that
E. is zero at all levels of T below T. 69 ) is enough to offset the amount
by which E, at T, exceeds Ey at T,. This argument would be illustrated
as follows:

Case (1)
Income (Ey)

and SelfRespect (E,)
Expectation
of Bottom

--

xT
Tax-Transfer Activity (T)

In case (1), T must be increased so much to achieve the minimum (relative) standard of living for the bottom which will confirm
69

See note 65 supra & accompanying text.
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Income (Ey)j

I

and SelfRespect (E8)
Expectation
of Bottom

Er

TY

T.

Tax-Transfer Activity (T)
the bottom's self-respect that the "total" value of E" and E, at T. is
less than the value of E, alone when T is fixed at T,. The opposite is
true in case (2). But it is a mistake to treat E, and E as mutually
combinable and substitutable in this way. In the Rawlsian vision,
income is virtually worthless without self-respect7 0 So the question of
adjusting the difference principle's application to take account of
self-respect boils down to a conceptually simple idea: If it is necessary, in order to confirm the bottom's self-respect, to increase taxtransfer activity beyond the point where the bottom's income is
maximized, we are to do so.
We have thus brought the satisficing good of self-respect within
the maximizing structure of the difference principle, by showing that
on its account maximization of the bottom's prospects may require
tax-transfer activity which is suboptimal with regard to the bottom's
income. In so doing, we have come as far as we can in pursuit of
some implication in the difference principle of an insurance-rights
package. Yet the quest has failed. Through a somewhat elusive notion
of relative deprivation, we can see the possibility that an existing
state of distribution might be perceived as unjust because of the
bottom's inability to satisfy certain needs, considered in the comparative light of what others are able to enjoy. But there are only two
possible remedies for such a situation. The preferred remedy, expected to suffice in most cases, is to raise the bottom's real income to
7

oSee RAw.ns 440, 535. It is true that Raws speaks in passing, id. 362, of assigning
relative weights to self-respect and income in arriving at an index of the bottom's
prospects. But this view seems so sharply at odds with the subsequent, more comprehensive elucidation of self-respect that it should perhaps be disregarded.
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the maximum achievable level. As we have already seen, 71 there are
no insurance-rights implications in that approach. An additional possible remedy-the one brought to light by the introduction of selfrespect as a primary social good-is taxation and transfer calculated
to reduce both the top's and the bottom's real incomes, but to reduce
the top's at a faster rate so as to narrow the relative-deprivation gap.
But this is hardly a remedy that one would associate with the idea of
insurance rights.
Though we have finished our exploration of the difference principle, we have not yet finished with the primary good of self-respect.
Before continuing with our examination of it7 2 it will be helpful to

see what the opportunity and liberty principles might have to contribute to a notion of constitutional welfare rights.
b. The Opportunity Principle
This principle requires a degree of compensatory service to what
we could call the "priming" needs of each individual, as by provision
of basic education. Rawls does not say that any education must be
publicly provided in kind, or that any compensatory right regarding
education cannot be satisfied by general monetary transfers. But by
attaching this right to the lexically preferred opportunity principle,
Rawls must mean that it has to be satisfied before the difference
principle can be allowed to operate-that compensatory satisfaction
of the opportunity interest is a prerequisite to allowing any income
inequalities to arise in the marketplace. It seems to follow that no
one may be precluded from the requisite education by income shortage;
and this would be, then, an insurance right. Even so, it might not
generate a clearly justiciable claim unless its extent could be more
precisely determined.
Now although the expression "fair equality of opportunity" seems
to suggest an intuitionistic criterion of how far to cut into dispositive
liberty on behalf of opportunity, the theory as a whole may give
stronger guidance. Rawls believes his contractarian construct should
generate assurances of educational offset for environmental accidents
of background and upbringing, but not for genetic accidents of inheritance.7' This distinction may not defy translation into social policy. 4
71 Text accompanying notes 43-60 supra.
72
Text accompanying notes 77-80 infra.
73Any further compensation for disadvantage in the natural-talents lottery is to be
of the less-than-fully-offsetting type implied by the difference principle. See RAwLs 73-75,
511.
74 See I CAL. GEN. Ass., SENATE SELxcT Comm. ON ScHOOL DisnucT FNANcE,FnTAL
REPORT

39-43 (1962).
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If in the present state of educational technology it does not yield
claims so determinate as to be justiciable, that it may someday yield
them is perhaps not unimaginable.
The scope of welfare rights implied by the opportunity principle
may not be limited to goods which are strictly "educational." Unaccompanied by subsistence or health or freedom from extreme environmental deprivation, how could educational offerings effectuate fair
equality of opportunity? The priority of the opportunity principle over
the difference principle and that of dispositive liberty must mean that
education's effective biological entailments, whatever they are, must
be satisfied as a prior condition to reliance on the pure procedural
justice of the market-even supposing that such reliance would tend
to maximize the bottom's real-income expectations, thus satisfying the
difference principle. If so, the catalogue of welfare rights would reach
beyond educational goods and (at least with regard to persons of
educable age) into welfare domains which we tend to associate with
the difference principle and the social minimum. And these additional
rights seem more justiciable than the core education claim itself, and
more justiciable under the opportunity principle than under the difference principle. It seems possible to arrive at somewhat objective and
nonrelativistic descriptions of the levels of subsistence, health, and
environmental amenity necessary to make persons receptive to educational offerings.
c. The Liberty Principle
Enjoyment of basic liberties, like enjoyment of educational opportunity, has fairly straightforward and objective biological entailments. Thus the right to provision of these may rank with liberty
among the social priorities established by the theory of justice as
fairness. Rawls so indicates when he says that the priority of liberty
over satisfaction of material wants is not unqualified, that in some
circumstances the lexically articulated conception of justice may have
to give way to a "general conception" which permits trade-offs among
all social values-liberty along with material goods-as long as those
trade-offs satisfy the difference principle.75 This line of thought leads
to a division of material wants into those which are and are not basic:
To be sure, it is not the case that when the priority of
liberty holds, all material wants are satisfied. Rather these
desires are not so compelling as to make it rational for the
persons in the original position to agree to satisfy them by
accepting a less than equal freedom.... Until the basic wants
75

See RAwLs 62, 303.
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of individuals can be fulfilled, the relative urgency of their
interest in liberty cannot be firmly decided in advance. It
will depend on the claims of the least favored as seen from
the constitutional and legislative stages. But under favorable
circumstances the fundamental interest in determining our
plan of life eventually assumes a prior place. 6
d. Justice as Fairness as a Whole
The good of self-respect seems to play a dual role in the theory
of justice as fairness. It is, as we have seen, one of the primary goods,
along with income and wealth, with respect to which the difference
principle demands that the bottom's prospects be maximized. In this
role self-respect may be said to be coordinate with income and
wealth"7 and subordinate to rights and liberties, in the lexicon of
primary social goods. But there is another perspective in which confirmation and nurture of self-respect are the end and objective of all
the principles of justice taken together. In this perspective, selfrespect is the preeminent social good, superordinate even to rights
and liberties. The liberty principle, the opportunity principle, and the
difference principle--each separately and all in their convergent impact
-are elaborated and justified in terms of their tendency to instill
and safeguard self-respect; and insofar as it is feared that one or
another of these principles in isolation may be insufficiently solicitous
of self-respect, it is shown how one or another of the other principles
may counteract this concern." Self-respect thus becomes a central
element in the justification of the whole theory.
It follows that if welfare rights can be shown essential to selfrespect, in any sense additional to those in which the difference, opportunity, and liberty principles severally imply such rights, the theory of
justice as fairness implies them in this additional sense as well. Thus
the difference principle implies welfare rights in the elusive form of
whatever is necessary to prevent the undermining of self-respect by
relative deprivation. The opportunity and liberty principles imply
welfare rights as more objective, less relativistic biological entailments
of opportunity and liberty. In addition, the central and preeminent
good of self-respect may imply welfare rights reaching beyond those
biological entailments, and not depending on notions of relative deprivation for their justification. Perhaps, for example, self-respect
requires the opportunity to be creative in some medium which gives
76 1d. 543.
7
7But more precisely it seems to be a condition of the enjoyment of income and
wealth. See text accompanying note 70 supra.

78 See RAwLs 534-48.
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pleasure to others-artistic performance, crafts, sport, or whatever 7 9- though perhaps no one would say that he was degraded by not having
had such opportunities, or that his educational offering or civil and
political liberties were rendered worthless without it.
Professor Fried has suggested that it would be possible to
"[elaborate] a comprehensive theory of rights within the terms of
Rawis' general scheme."8 The foregoing discussion should confirm
that this is indeed possible for welfare rights, although it seems to
require some verbal modification of the "general scheme" of lexically
articulated principles of justice. Somewhere near the top of the priority
list there belongs a "welfare rights" principle, signifying that the
questions of maximizing the bottom's position with regard to money
income and wealth, and even of protecting the bottom against the
degrading effects of relative deprivation, are simply not to be addressed
until provision for some articulated package of basic welfare needs
has been secured.
In sum, it is a mistake to think of the social minimum as an
institutional feature linked specifically and peculiarly to the difference
principle (whereas democracy or a bill of rights, say, would be associated with the liberty principle). The social minimum is an implication of justice as fairness taken as a whole theory. While the difference
principle taken in isolation seems to have a simple, maximizing thrust,
that is not true of the whole theory. The theory as a whole reflects a
degree of risk aversion, imputing to representative persons a structured set of priorities under which the question of generally amplifying
one's income simply is not reached until adequate assurance has been
made for what one specifically needs in order that his basic rights,
liberties, and opportunities may be effectively enjoyed, and his selfrespect maintained.
B. Judicial Role
The principles of justice as we have been exploring them are part
of an ideal theory of justice as fairness. The ideal, to which an appropriate conception of justice is to be wedded, is that of a "well-ordered
society"--"one designed to advance the good of its members and
effectively regulated by a public conception of justice,""1 or, as Rawls
sometimes says, one which is in "a state of near justice." ' A central
part of the argument for justice as fairness is that it meets the test
79 See id. 440-42.
80
Fried, Book Review, 85 HARv. L. REV. 1691, 1697 (1972).
81 R wVEs 453. See generally id. 453-62.
82d. 351.
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of stability-that when constitutional and statutory arrangements, and
the institutions they help to shape, are seen to conform to the principles
of justice they will, by virtue of that conformity, command the continuing, mutually reinforcing support of a citizenry whose members
perceive both one another's acknowledgment of the principles and the
inclination of their shared institutions to conform.8 3 The essential point
here, for our purposes, is that the principles of justice are chosen and
tested, for stability as well as other qualities, on the supposition of a
society which is well-ordered with respect to those very principles.
This is ideal theory. "[J]ustice as fairness is framed to accord with
[the] idea of [a well-ordered] society." 4 The question is whether a
societal system, once publicly founded on the principles of justice,
will then be in a stable equilibrium state which is good for its members.
Now one may ask whether this ideal conception of justice in a
well-ordered society has any place for the "judicial review" part of
our traditional model of the constitutionalized legal order. In ideal
theory, constitution-making is a hypothetical step in contractarian
derivation of procedures and rules for a society supposed to be wellordered. We assume that the veil of ignorance worn in the original
position has been lifted to the point where participants in the constitutional convention have knowledge of the basic traits of their society,
such as its material wealth, technological capabilities, sophistication in
economic and sociological matters and the like-what we could call
the society's "evolutionary circumstances." The particular situations
and traits of the parties remain, as in the original position, unknown
to them. In this contextually enriched forum the framers choose rules
and practices, somewhat more specific than the principles of justice,
designed for optimal implementation of those principles in their
society.

5

There is no doubt that a constitution thus fashioned for a wellordered society might set up an independent magistracy and fence
it out of the legislative domain, to provide a neutral and politically
detached forum for settling disputes over the meaning of legislatively
approved legal rules and principles, and for assuring their fair and
83 See id. 4-5, 138, 454-55.

84 Id.454.
Best of all, a theory should present a description of an ideally just state of affairs,
a conception of a well-ordered society such that the aspiration to realize this
state of affairs, and to maintain it in being, answers to our good and is continuous with our natural sentiments. A perfectly just society should be part of
an ideal that rational human beings could desire more than anything else once
they had full knowledge and experience of what it was.
Id. 477 (footnote omitted).
85 See id. 196-97, 200.
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nondiscriminatory application. 86 But it is far less clear whether or
why such a constitution would give a judicial branch authority to
enforce, against the will of the legislative branch, either "natural
rights 81 7 or constitutional rights which directly and visibly implement
natural rights.
In ideal theory, the original position and the constitutional and
legislative stages are distinguished from one another only by the
amount and specificity of information supposed to be available about
the society and its problems and needs-and, accordingly, the appropriate level of generality for the promulgated rules, practices, and
institutional arrangements." Ideal framers are seen as none other than
the imaginary "representative persons" of the original position, who
have simply shifted their discussions over to the constitutional stage,
having once agreed on the governing principles of justice and received
information about their society's evolutionary circumstances.8 9 Rawis
seems to think of ideal legislators as persons actually chosen for this
office under the procedures approved at the constitutional stage." But
their behavior should be no different than if we imagine them to be
the same set of law-givers, now twice removed from the original position and exposed to the fuller information appropriate to the legislative
stage. Consistent with the assumption, arguendo, of a society wellordered with regard to the principles of justice, and with the fully
argued position that those principles are stable, it appears that ideal
legislators must tend to act in such a way as to make judicial review
superfluous.
The argument for the stability of justice as fairness explicitly
rejects any notion of the legislative system as a "fairness machine" 91
deliberately constructed so as to harness, in market-like fashion, the
selfish drives of legislators and their constituents in such a way that
the vector sum of these drives corresponds with something we are
pleased to call the (or a) "public interest."92 (Had that been the
approach, one might have speculated as to a role for judicial review
86 See id. 238-40.

87 1 am using the term "natural rights" to mean rights implied by principles of
justice in a coherent philosophical theory of justice.
88

See RAwLs 198-99.

89 See id. 196-97.
90 See id. 198, 356-58.
91For discussion of this concept, see Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness:
Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HAnv. L. Rv.
1165, 1246 (1967).

92
See RAwLS 359-61, 493, explaining that a "fairness machine" is not operative. For
a contrasting view of society that would have to rely on a fairness-machine notion, see
id. 455, 521-22. For one extended development of such a notion, see A. DowNs, A.r
EcoNomic THEORY OF DEmOcRAcy (1957).
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on occasions of more or less obvious breakdown of the fairness
machine.) 9 3 And Rawls shows no affinity for the related idea of a
division of labor between legislature and reviewing court, in which
it is the special virtue of the legislature to be a forum for the vigorous
free play of interests groping towards optimal accommodation, and of
the court to be a kind of superego, backstopping the process when
its vigor and enthusiasm carry it beyond the established bounds of
constitutionalized moral principle.94 Rather, Rawls argues strenuously
that, given a society well-ordered with regard to his proposed principles
of justice, the resulting sense of justice of legislators and their constituents-and their perception that it is consistent with their good
that they should have this sense--will work effectively to keep the
system on course.95
The claim is not that there will never be legislative deviations
from what perfect justice, perfectly understood, would dictate. The
method of moral argument indicated by the criterion of "stability"
accepts an opposite assumption that the proposed principles of justice
will sometimes be violated even in an ideally constituted regime. It is
from that assumption that the moral theorist then proceeds to support
his favored principles by showing how strongly their public recognition will tend to engender in the populace a sense of justice which, in
turn, will work to ensure that the inevitable legislative deviations will
be temporary. 0 Civil disobedience may be regarded as the most dramatic manifestation of the stabilizing public sense of justice.17 Less
dramatic, but more germane for our purposes, is the simple notion that
ideal legislators themselves are citizens, animated no less than others
by the sense of justice. They are, accordingly, expected to engage in
mutual discussion and pooling of judgments about what is just and
(secondarily) efficient under the circumstances. Votes are counted,
and the majority rules, only because in problematic situations that
is thought not a bad way to arrive at sound judgments, and because
that procedure is consistent with the liberty principle's demand for
equal participatory rights. 8
93

For example, consider the notion of "invidious classifications" discussed in Micbelman, supra note 17, at 19-20.
94 For a more complete articulation of this idea, see A. BicxE, THM LrAST DANGERous BRANcH 24-26, 95 (1962).
95 See RAWLS 493.
96
See id. 458.
97
See id. 364-68.
98
See id. 356-62. The need for majority rule as distinguished from the principle of
unanimity which governs the original position and, presumably, the constitutional stage
arises from the greater richness of factual context at the legislative stage.
The restrictions on information [applicable at the legislative stage; i.e., the ideal
legislator is supposed to be ignorant of his particular situation in society] will
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Now once the possibility is conceded of legislative error and disturbance of equilibrium, even in a well-ordered society, we may ask
whether a role is not thereby opened for judicial review-that is, the
role of calling attention to and demanding correction of mistakes when
they do occur, of activating the temporarily lapsed sense of justice
and catalyzing the process whereby that sense regains control. The
question, particularly acute in the case of welfare rights, is why we
should suppose that occupancy of judicial office will reflect any special
ability to perform this role. Surely Rawls is correct when he writes
that even in ideal circumstances,
judgment [regarding economic and social policies] frequently
depends upon speculative political and economic doctrines
and upon social theory generally. Often the best that we can
say of a law or policy is that it is at least not clearly unjust.
• . . It is often perfectly plain and evident when the equal
liberties are violated ....
But this state of affairs is comparatively rare with social and economic policies regulated by
the difference principle 9
Thus it may be doubted (and Rawls doubts) 100 that, under the informational constraints of the constitutional stage, welfare rights could
be articulated prudently at that stage with much greater specificity
than that already contained in the principles of justice themselves;
and, if not, that judicial officers could contribute anything worthwhile
to recognition and articulation of such rights at the legislative stage.
The argument against judicial review for welfare rights (in ideal
theory) is yet stronger than this. While the gains to be expected from
this institution are unclear, certain costs are clear. The right to maximum mutual political liberty implies a democratic form of government
not guarantee agreement [as in the prior stages], since the tendencies of the
general social facts will often be ambiguous and difficult to assess.
Id. 357.
0
0 Id. 199. Though Rawls speaks here of "policies regulated by the difference principle," the context suggests that we should understand him as meaning to include all policies
regarding the social minimum-a notion which, as we have seen, is best regarded as
regulated by the theory of justice as a whole rather than peculiarly by the difference
principle. See text accompanying notes 77-78 supra.
100 Rawls
imagine[s] . . . a division of labor between stages in which each deals with
different questions of social justice. This division roughly corresponds to the two
parts of the basic structure. The first principle of equal liberty is the primary
standard for the constitutional convention. Its main requirements are that the
fundamental liberties of the person and liberty of conscience and freedom of
thought be protected and that the political process as a whole be a just procedure. . . . The second principle comes into play at the stage of the legislature.
It dictates that social and economic- policies be aimed at maximizing the longterm expectations of the least advantaged. . . . At this point the full range of
general economic and social facts are brought to bear.
RAWLS 199.
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in which the legislature is either composed of or accountable to the
citizens, and decisions are made according to majoritarian processes. 01'
Rawls does not accept the view that "the political liberties are of less
intrinsic importance than liberty of conscience and freedom of the
person," or that "the chief merit of the principle of participation is
to insure that the government respects the rights and welfare of the
governed." 10 2 He argues, rather, that equal political liberty is valued
and enjoyed in its own right, that it "strengthen[s] men's sense of
their own worth, enlarge[s] their intellectual and moral sensibilities,
and lay[s] the basis for a sense of duty and obligation upon which
the stability of just institutions depends."' 0

3

Judicial review introduces

a sharp and clear inequality of political voice (concerning what the
principles of justice or their constitutional derivatives require in a
given situation), and so can be justified, under the first principle, only
insofar as it works to maximize the total system of liberties enjoyed
by those accorded the lesser voice (i.e., the nonjudges) °10 While
Rawls acknowledges that plausible arguments in this form can be
made (drawing on traditional arguments for bills of rights, concern
over majority tyranny, etc.), he seems inclined to the view that these
arguments should be treated most circumspectly for a well-ordered
society. 10 5
The foregoing considerations should help us grasp what Rawls'
means when he insists that the question of justice and right is to be
held apart from the question of legality. A system which is wellordered, and just on the whole, may on particular occasions act in
ways which we are convinced are in themselves unjust. On some of
these occasions, refusal to abide by the law may be appropriate.
Indeed, the readiness of persons to engage in, say, civil disobedience
on appropriate occasions, and the potential efficacy of this conduct,
may be a part of the overall makeup of the society which leads us
to call it well-ordered-an important stabilizing element which avoids
the affront to equal liberties inherent in judicial review. But mostly
the overall justice of the system makes it reasonable to expect that
a just person will abide by occasional failures of justice. This expectation is a third factor which, combined with belief in the efficacy of
the public sense of justice and the tendency of judicial review to undermine equal liberties, suggests that the better-ordered the society is
101 See id. 221-23, 227.
02

-1

d. 229-30.

103 Id. 234.
104 See id. 229-30.
105 See id. 231-34. But see id. 224, 229.
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supposed to be, the less interested we become in the question of
judicially enforceable constitutional rights, especially welfare rights.
And so, insofar as the theory of justice as fairness is simply an expression of Rawls' understanding of what a well-ordered society would be
like, we should not expect him to be greatly troubled by the theory's
questionable ability to generate justiciable welfare rights.
II.

NONIDEAL THEORY:

FROM

NATURAL RIGHT TO

POSITIVE ENTITLEMENT

Of course Rawls' effort to develop an ideal theory of justice is
not intended as completely idle speculation. The ideal theory and its
counterpart conception of a well-ordered society are meant to define
a state toward which we should want to move. They "set up an aim
to guide the course of social reform."1 " And so there is need-to
which Rawls does not generally purport to address himself-for "nonideal" theory to account for the role of justice as fairness in a society
which is not fully and maturely just-a society whose members do not
yet generally and publicly acknowledge the principles of justice, or
whose material circumstances, or political and social maturation, have
not yet reached a point admitting full implementation of the principles. 07
Judicially protected substantive constitutional rights seem intuitively
as plausible in nonideal theory as they are dubious in ideal theory,
although only in passing does Rawls seem to think of the constitution
in this way. 0 As we have seen, he offers a professedly stylized view
of the constitutional convention as a hypothetical step in contractarian
derivation of procedures and rules for a well-ordered society-that is,
as a part of ideal theory. 09
Of course, a society's evolutionary circumstances as disclosed to
the constitutional convention may be such that the society is in or
verging on a well-ordered state, but what if they are not? What are
the framers to do if one of the evolutionary circumstances disclosed
to them is that the society's members presently fail to understand,
acknowledge, and feel confident of other people's understanding and
acknowledgment of those principles of justice to which the convention
members themselves are committed by virtue of their recent encounter
in the original position? Under such conditions the full and immediate
implementation of the principles might be impossible, and oblique and
imperfect forms of implementation might hasten the process whereby
106 Id. 245.
07

See id. 245-46.
108 See id. 246-47.
109See text accompanying notes 84-90 supra.
'
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their acceptance increases, and the public sense of justice implants
itself. Thus the framers of the constitution might look toward rules
and practices which produce some optimum mix of actualizing justice
for the members of the present generation and hastening its fuller
realization for future generations. They would then be seeking institutional arrangements which could realize (or improve the chances of
realizing) certain rights even in the face of legislative hostility or
apathy, and which also could proclaim rights and principles of justice
in such a way as to advance their public acceptance. Because the
parties would be in circumstances requiring optimization (i.e., tradeoff), they might agree to sacrifice some of the rights which would be
theirs in a perfectly just society, or some aspects of these rights,
including rights to maximum equal political voice, for the sake of
realizing other rights.
We can approach the problem of optimization by way of Rawls'
treatment (scattered through various parts of the book)"o of the case
in which a society's state of economic development is so primitive that
it cannot produce enough to satisfy everyone's basic wants-those
which have to be satisfied before it makes sense to talk of enjoyment
of any liberties, much less of equal liberties."' To the extent that such
conditions make impossible the full and immediate realization of the
principles of justice, and especially the priority of the equal liberties,
they permit relaxation of the lexical priority rules-relaxation which
may lead all the way back to the "general conception" of justice consisting of the difference principle alone." 2 Specifically, equality of
political voice may be suspended. "[I] t may be reasonable to forego
[this equality] when the long-run benefits are great enough to transform a less fortunate society into one where the equal liberties can be
' 3
fully enjoyed."
Does parallel reasoning hold when it is underdevelopment of the
society's sense of justice, rather than of its productive capacity, which
makes impossible the full and immediate realization of the principles
of justice? If so we might have isolated the germ of a Rawlsian account
of substantive constitutional rights and judicial review.
But matters are not so simple. The cases of economic and moral
underdevelopment stand quite differently with respect to the stipulations governing the original position. On the one hand, knowledge of
the society's material circumstances is specifically withheld from the
110 E.g.,

RAwLs 247, 300-01, 542-44.
"'I See id. 543.
112 See text accompanying note 75 supra.
113 RAv-as 247,
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parties; and this is why a sliding-scale conception of justice emerges
which is adaptable to the whole imaginable range of such circumstances
-proposing a rather firm set of priority rules for societies beyond a
certain level of material comfort, a simple general conception for
societies below a certain level of poverty, and, by implication, a continuous series of progressively relaxed priority systems for societies
in intermediate stages. On the other hand, it is expressly stipulated
that "in assessing conceptions of justice the persons in the original
position are to assume that the one they adopt will be strictly complied with. The consequences of their agreement are to be worked
out on this basis."'1 14 Should it later be disclosed to the parties, now
acting as a constitutional convention, that this assumption does not
hold for their society, one might think they have no choice but to
disband. The only principles they have available for appraising proposed constitutions are, it turns out, partly based on a false assumption.
Yet it would be grotesquely trivializing to regard ideal theory as
relevant only for societies already verging on perfection as defined
by its precepts. The assumption of strict compliance is a part of the
method proposed for deriving principles, not a restriction on the relevance or applicability of whatever principles are derived through the
method. On the contrary, the very purpose of deriving the principles
must be to help us clarify our notions of what is to be done when the
strict-compliance assumption fails.
So, for illustration, if the assumption fails at the legislative or
postlegislative stage, Rawls contemplates corrective measures appropriate to that stage, such as civil disobedience. And if the assumption
should fail at the constitutional stage-if the information appropriate
to that stage should disclose a failure of the assumption-there seems
no reason not to consider the introduction of corrective measures at
that stage. Plausible correctives would include substantive constitutional rights and judicial review." 5
But to consider does not necessarily mean to embrace. Substantive rights and judicial review, though plausible devices for coping at
the constitutional stage with underdevelopment of the public sense of
114 Id. 145.
1 15
The analogy may seem imperfect insofar as we regard effective civil disobedience
as a manifestation of well-orderedness rather than as a device for coping with its absence.
Compare text accompanying note 97 supra with text accompanying note 105 supra. Yet
on inspection this symptomatic view of civil disobedience seems to mean simply that it
is only in societies where the public sense of justice has passed a certain level of development that we should expect to see resort to this device or think it appropriate or potentially effective. We shall find it possible to offer similar statements about substantive
constitutional rights.
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justice, may on close examination be found unacceptable, or acceptable
only within rather strict limits.
The case for judicial review remains harder than that for relaxing
the priority of liberty in the face of material shortage. A society
which cannot produce enough to satisfy everyone's basic wants is,
by definition, not a society in which "equal liberties can be fully
enjoyed."" For that reason, it is not ultimately repugnant to the
priority of liberty to allow severe or unequal restrictions of liberty
now, if these measures are found necessary to boost productivity to
the point where full and equal liberty can be truly realized later. Only
in a superficial sense can one even say that the priority of liberty is
relaxed in this case; at a deeper level, that priority is fully respected.",
Now once a material base sufficient to satisfy everyone's basic
wants is assured, and only a deficient public sense of justice impedes
full realization of the principles, is there still room to argue that equal
political liberty may be restricted (by judicial review, for example)
for liberty's sake? The argument is plausible insofar as judicial review would be singularly effective in realizing basic liberties (e.g.,
rights to free speech and equal voting) or rights to the fulfillment of
everyone's basic wants on which enjoyment of these liberties depends.
But use of judicial review to vindicate welfare rights not strictly
associated with the basic liberties'" would flatly contradict the priority of liberty. Once the basic liberties and their effective enjoyment
have been assured to all, justice as fairness might well insist that all
other claims gain recognition in the participatory forum. Should it be
the case that the requisite public sense of justice is currently lacking,
it may also be the case that entrusting its nurture to judicial review
will, paradoxically, indefinitely stunt the growth of this sense. The
answer depends on the facts of human psychology, and the notion of
the priority of liberty reflects a view of those facts which cautions
against judicial review. Equality of political participation, it bears
repeating, "lay[s] the basis for a sense of duty and obligation upon
which the stability of just institutions depends.""' 9 Moreover,
as the conditions of civilization improve, the marginal significance for our good of further economic and social advantages
diminishes relative to the interests of liberty, which become
stronger as the conditions for the exercise of the equal freedoms are more fully realized. .
116 See text accompanying note 113 supra.

.

. Increasingly it becomes

117 Rawls regards the parties in the original position as speaking for "continuing
lines of claims," or "as representatives of families." RAwas 128.

118 See text accompanying notes 72-75 supra.
119 See text accompanying note 103 supra.
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more important to secure the free internal life of the various
communities of interests in which persons and groups seek to
achieve, in modes of social union consistent with equal liberty, the ends and excellences to which they are drawn. In
addition men come to aspire to some control over the laws
and rules that regulate their association, either by directly
taking part themselves in its affairs or indirectly through
representatives with whom they are affiliated by ties of culture and social situation.
...

[Material desires beyond the basic wants] are not so

compelling as to make it rational for the persons in the
original position to agree to satisfy them by accepting a less
than equal freedom.... One reason for this... is the central
place of the primary good of self-respect and the desire of
human beings to express their nature in a free social union
with others' 0
Yet we must not forget that welfare rights, even those reaching
beyond fulfillment of basic wants, also have a role in promoting the
self-respect in whose absence the sense of justice will not flourishthe same self-respect, indeed, that the equal liberties are meant to
serve.'' There may, then, be a role for constitutionalized welfare
rights even after it appears that everyone has, so to speak, enough to
eat. So there we have the uneasy case for judicially enforceable, substantive constitutional rights as a means of coping with evolutionary
deficiencies in the public's sense of justice. In order to secure the
enforcement of certain rights, all looking ultimately to self-respect,
the framers might be prepared to sacrifice some of their rights of equal
political liberty by authorizing politically aloof courts to override the
popular legislative will. If so, the foregoing discussion shows that they
would certainly try to limit that sacrifice by insisting that any such
interventions be convincingly supportable by argument appealing to
widely shared premises.
The framers might try to write all such premises specifically
into the constitution (as in a bill of rights). Or they might also permit
the reviewing judges to invoke such other precepts as are found latent
in popular morality. Revealing, clarifying, and rationalizing such
latent moral principles might be deemed an important part of the
court's work. Judicial review of the latter sort seems to carry greater
threats to the self-respect cherished by the equal-liberty principle
than review strictly anchored to specific constitutional texts. So even
if the latter sort of judicial review were permitted, the framers would
.20 RAVV
542-43.
21
1 See text accompanying notes 62-70, 77-79 supra.
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try to minimize any harm to self-respect by making premises explicit
in the constitution when they could. And the resultant constitutional
statement of rights would be in a form (say, of insurance rights)
which might depart from what the ideal theory would imply in a wellordered society in which judicial review was not important.
If a given society's public sense of justice appeared to the constitutional convention to be so underdeveloped that judicial review of
legislation action would on the whole advance the cause of justice,
the convention could not expect that there would be, at the legislative
stage, much convergence of judgment on the size or makeup of the
just social minimum, or much hope for arguing persuasively that
persons were receiving less than the minimum, or much reason for
confidence that the legislature by itself would satisfy the minimum
requirement. 2 2 But the parties to the constitutional convention would
not want to give up completely their welfare claims. They might want
to create justiciable rights which would go a significant distance toward fulfilling those claims. And even apart from their reliance on
judicial review, they might want to state some welfare rights in a form
which could provide a ground for persuasive argument in political
forums at an evolutionary stage in which popular perceptions and
judgments about distributive-share justice were still rather clouded;
such rights would serve as surrogates for the elusive claim to a proper
social minimum. Moreover, the framers would be concerned to establish a political regime which would be reasonably workable--one
which could know when it has satisfied the background conditions of
distributive-share justice, and visibly seem to have satisfied them,
so as to be justified in turning to other matters. Thus the framers
might resort to a rather specific catalogue of wants (on the order of
decent food and shelter, health care, a basic education, and effective
access to judicial forums) which they could with reasonable certainty
agree would have to be satisfied (given what they know about their
society's economic circumstances and social and political development). That is, they might at the constitutional stage be able to agree
that the social minimum would provide everyone with at least enough
to assure satisfaction of certain wants, even if they could not agree
how much more or what else was in justice required.
In order that these rights might gain effective support from a
publicly acceptable form of judicial review and from convincing advocacy in political forums, the framers might choose to state them as
insurance rights rather then as assurances of economic opportunity
122

See text accompanying note 99 supra.

CONSTITUTIONAL WELFARE RIGHTS

1003

(and general transfer programs) sufficient to fulfill important needs
as and when they accrue. Assurances of the latter sort, though preferred in ideal theory" and perhaps also superior from the standpoint
of efficiency, would hold no particular attraction at the constitutional
stage in our supposed nonideal situation; for they would give neither
courts nor advocates any special foothold for challenging legislative
judgments. If a list of insurance rights did emerge, it might be a good
deal less specific as to service levels than as to types of needs. For
reasons to be developed below, the framers might believe that interplay
between the legislature and the courts would tend towards satisfactory
service levels, once the constitution had triggered the attention of both
branches to the types of needs in question.
III. THE PLACE OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY IN
CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION

Two features of the suggested nonideal account of substantive
constitutional rights and judicial review deserve emphasis: First, the
account does not purport in any way to be an historical version, even
a stylized or Procrustean one, of how written constitutions, substantive
,rights, and judicial review have actually evolved. It is, rather, an
explanation in principle of how these institutions may, in terms of a
certain theory of justice, be harmoniously understood and related to
other extant institutions and, more critically, to supposed underlying
ends (such as democracy and self-respect) with which judicially enforced substantive rights may sometimes seem discordant. Second,
this is on its face an account only of why a certain class of guaranties
might be written into a constitution, in contemplation of possible vindication by such means as judicial review and legislative advocacy.
It does not fully specify the guaranties that should be included, or
treated as if included when they are not, although our exploration of
the substantive welfare content of ideal theory'2 may provide some
clues.
An account of this sort may have practical and evaluative import
for current legislative and judicial behavior. For, I believe, this behavior and our understanding of it are conditioned primarily by a need
for contemporary coherence and comprehensibility, and only secondarily by historical reconstruction of the framers' intent. 2 5
12 3
See note 43 supra & accompanying text.
124 Text accompanying notes 21-80 supra.

125 Why do we or should we try to reconstruct what the framers had specifically
in mind, in the course of deciding what we are now to make of the texts they wrote?
Is it not because we think that in the process of attempting such reconstruction we
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A.

Moral Theory as a Direct Source of Rights:
The Case for Judicial Restraint

Let us, heroically, suppose ourselves satisfied that Rawis' theory
of justice as fairness suggests certain constitutional welfare rights as a
way of doing justice in a society generally structured as ours is and in
like evolutionary circumstances; that the theory further implies an
institution of judicial review competent to demand fulfillment of at
least some substantive rights; and, finally, that the theory ultimately
succeeds in justifying itself in terms of coherence with moral views
that we can confidently say are those of the society at large-that is,
it persuasively accounts for and lends harmonious meaning to the
generality of the society's public institutions and practices, including
constitutional texts and traditions and other official and popular expressions of goals and ideals.'
Given those suppositions, are we to
shall often encounter clues and reminders of principles and notions (perhaps the only
principles and notions) which can set those texts in coherent and comprehensible relation to one another and to the whole set of arrangements under which we continue to
live, but whose informing ideas we sometimes lose sight of? Insofar as that is our
quest, nonhistorical accounts would seem to have a competitive claim on our attentions, according to their felt explanatory power.
126 E.g., Housing Act of 1949, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1441-43 (1971). "The Congress hereby declares that the general welfare and security of the Nation and the health and living
standards of its people require . . . the realization as soon as feasible of the goal of
a decent home and a suitable living environment for every American family . . . ." Id.
§ 1441.
Professor Feinberg's lucid description of the "coherence logic of ethical justification"
will serve well at this point to remind us of what Rawls, as a "coherence theorist," is up
to:
[Coherence theorists] do not believe it possible to base an ethical system on
self-evident moral first principles, or on direct intuitive insight into, or rational
apprehension of, a uniquely moral realm of truth. Nor do they think it possible to deduce moral first principles from statements of fact, making no challengeable moral assumptions along the way. On the other hand, these writers
are not willing to deprive general principles of their usual role in arguments for
relatively specific maxims and judgments. General principles and factual premises
do entail specific moral judgments, they admit, but the most suitable general
principles, they insist, are those that summarize and are supported by the specific
moral judgments in which we have the most confidence. We justify specific moral
judgments, on their view, by deriving them from general principles, and the
latter are supported in turn by a demonstration that the right moral judgments
(other moral judgments) follow from them. This may be circular, but it is unavoidably and non-viciously so.
*
if there is no common ground of moral conviction whatever between
two individuals [who are in disagreement over a moral question], either at the
level of general principle or the level of singular judgment, then the game is over
before it begins. Logic cannot build castles on air. It is always a reasonable
assumption, however, that two individuals in ethical disagreement over one
question can find other matters on which they are in solid agreement. In order
for one individual to "prove" that the other is wrong in a given belief he must
use those beliefs and principles of the other party which he himself shares. He
must show the other party that the belief he is currently defending is inconsistent
with one of his own principles, or if the subject of dispute is one of the other
party's principles, that it would commit him to a specific judgment which he
would be embarrassed to make. The way to convince another party of the truth
of a general moral principle is to show him that it summarizes and renders
coherent his own actual convictions better than any alternative principle.
Feinberg, Justice, Fairness and Rationality, 81 YAs.E L.J. 1004, 1019-20 (1972).
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conclude that the judiciary now should frankly take up the theory
and wield it in support of (or, as the case may be, opposition to)
various welfare-rights claims? We have already seen that the theory
1 27
itselfs suggests reasons for caution in approaching this question.
Imagine a claim to state provision of "decent" housing, brought
on behalf of a family including children of educable age, that plainly
has no other presently available way to acquire such housing, and
appealing to constitutional texts that are at best inconclusive on the
matter-say those guaranteeing equal protection of the laws, or protecting life, liberty, and property against deprivation attributable to
the state, or obligating the state to furnish education. 2 8 Let us further

suppose that the judges are intuitively drawn to recognition of the
claim. Their considered judgments tend to confirm it. They are, moreover, conversant with a body of speculative moral theory supporting
the claim, which they find persuasively justified by the kind of coherence already described. And all are further agreed that the question
cannot be conclusively resolved by historical research into what the
framers had in mind when they drafted and adopted the cited constitutional texts.

29

Nevertheless, we may expect to find the judiciary reluctant to
determine whether the claimed right to adequate housing exists and
is to be enforced if necessary by judicial mandate. The court's explanation of its abstinence is likely to suggest not so much denial of the
claimed right as judicial incompetence to answer the question, or
inability to answer it without violating a felt obligation to lay aside
personal "philosophy" or moral convictions in dealing with legal
claims. There is a rich and distinguished judicial and scholarly literature exploring possible reasons for self-restraint of this sort.3 0 To see
how the suggested "Rawlsian" account of judicial review relates to this
literature, some crude restatement of some of the literature's insights
is in order.
It is not immediately clear what features of our hypothetical case
should excite special doubts on the judges' part about their competence,
in the most direct sense of personal ability to perform the intellectual
operations, or to get at the information required to determine the exis7

12 See text accompanying notes 85-105 supra.
128 E.g., N.J. CoNsT. art. 8, § 4, guaranteeing

a "thorough and efficient" education
to all.
129 Perhaps not many would argue seriously against Professor Karst's statement
that, as a matter of actual history, "[today the fourteenth amendment embodies much
of what has become our natural-law Constitution." Karst, Not One Law at Rome and
Another at Athens: The Fourteenth Amendment in Nationwide Application, 1972 WAsH.
U.L.Q. 383. See Frank & Munro, The Original Understanding of "Equal Protection of
the Laws," 1972 WAsH. U.L.Q. 421, 476; cf. A. BIcxm, supra note 94, at 108-10.
180E.g., Professor Bickel's eloquent study cited in the preceding note.
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tence or violation of the claimed right. The issue's resolution is likely
to depend on a number of factors that are as accessible to judges as to
legislators, most if not all of which are of a sort that in other contexts
has often been regarded as well within-if not peculiarly within-the
judicial province: a parsing of constitutional texts, tradition, or accepted
principles of justice; or a correct reading of prevailing social standards
and sentiments. Even the perplexing questions of economic feasibility
which may be relevant-for example, whether there is some way to fulfill the claimed housing right without leaving the bottom worse off, on
the whole, than it now is-do not seem different in essence from other
issues that courts have deemed judicially triable, such as the economic
issues in a major industrial nuisance litigation.
More plausible is the notion of remedial incompetence-the notion
that judicial officers have no way of actually enforcing a determination
in favor of a right to adequate housing, because fulfilling it entails
actions (e.g.; raising and appropriating public funds and creating new
administrative structures) that are immediately controlled by the executive and legislative branches, and involves a complex of subsidiary
but vitally important choices which the judiciary lacks all basis for
making. But this notion by itself fails to distinguish our welfare-rights
1 2
31
case clearly from cases involving school desegregation' and finance, 3
and legislative reapportionment.'
In such cases courts have been
willing to try remedial devices designed to harness to the court's announced principle the competence and accountability of nonjudicial
public officials-most typically, a judicial mandate to legislative, executive, or administrative officers to prepare, submit, and carry out a
corrective plan. Indeed the prognosis for one or another of these approaches would seem good, assuming a modicurh of willingness to
comply on the part of these nonjudicial officials. The notion of remedial
incompetence seems to be at bottom a concern that the disposition to
comply in our welfare-rights case will be less than in the reapportionment, segregation, and school-finance cases-and less than in the
generality of cases in which governmental bodies are subjected to
specific and declaratory remedies, not to mention simple awards of
money damages. If this concern over compliance does not quite conV' E.g., Bradley v. Milliken, 468 F.2d 902 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 844
(1972). But see Bradley v. School Board, 462 F.2d 1058 (4th Cir. 1972).
132E.g., Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1971); Serrano v.
Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971); cf. Robinson v. Cahill, 62
N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273, additional opinion, 63 N.J. 196, 306 A.2d 65 (1973). The decision
of the Supreme Court in San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1
(1973), while reaching a conclusion on the merits contrary to those in Serrano and Van
Dusartz, did not purport to base that conclusion on any notion of remedial incompetence.
183E.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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tradict our supposition (and the predictable protestations of the
judges) 134 that they find the shelter claim intuitively appealing, it can
be only because the judges at the same time doubt their ability to make
it seem so clearly appealing to others. But why would judges who
themselves are convinced by the moral philosopher's arguments be
unable to persuade others in turn?
A more powerful and sophisticated version of the remedial incompetence notion would emphasize the amoebalike quality of budgetary and redistributive politics. If judicially forced to respond to
this claim on behalf of the poor, the political dynamic might reestablish its equilibrium by forsaking some other existing program
oriented towards their needs. 13 5 But if the underlying moral theory
suggests a broad spectrum of judicial protection against such possibilities, 36 then everything once again seems to turn on how confident
the judges are that the theory can be wielded persuasively enough to
induce compliance on all relevant fronts.
So we reach another interpretation of the incompetence notion:
that the court lacks modes of articulation and explanation under
which it can decide the case and maintain its appearance of answering
to external principle, the moral source of its influence on other parts
of government. Recognition of the claimed right to adequate housing
or of its violation might depend on factors which, although no less
appraisable by judges than by legislators, or by adjudicatory than by
legislative process, might nevertheless seem too vague, too ineffable,
or too debatable to furnish an acceptable basis for judicial action. A
judicial judgment on the matter might seem dictatorial, whereas a
parallel legislative judgment never could, given its representative
inputs and likely adverse impact on the narrow self-interest of the
majority.
We have been assuming throughout this discussion that the shelter
claim is intuitively appealing to the judges, and perceived by them as
coherent with a speculative theory which itself coheres with a much
broader range of evident societal ideals and practices. In light of this
assumption, every reason we have been able to give for judicial abstinence seems at first glance troublesome. We seem to be saying that
a decision which, once truly understood, would not popularly and
genuinely be felt to be repugnant on its merits, may nevertheless be
unacceptable because it is destined not be understood.
San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
See, e.g., Carrington, On Egalitarian Overzeal: A Polemic Against the Local
School Property Tax Cases, 1972 U. hL.L.F. 232, 253-54.
134 Cf.
135

136 See text accompanying notes 72-80 supra.
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How does this concern for the understandability of judicial decisions fit with our suggestion for a Rawlsian account of the institution
of judicial review? 3 ' In that account, judicial review seemed to presuppose the following:
1. Given the society's evolutionary circumstances, there is a
likelihood that even a representative, majoritarian legislature will sometimes act (or fail to act) in ways which
violate principles of justice.
2. On a significant number of occasions, these violations
will be such that they can be convincingly enough demonstrated by judges to induce willing rectification, although they are not so immediately visible and repugnant
as to prevent them from occurring in the first place.
3. When violations are judicially demonstrated-or when
they are determined within a course of judicial interventions which on the whole succeeds in demonstrating the
violations which it determines-the political branches
will comply with corrective judicial mandates.
Given Rawlsian premises, acceptance of judicial review thus reflects
a belief that it is possible and useful to cultivate a special capacity
for evaluating the compliance of legislative action (inaction) with
principles of justice or their derived constitutional embodiments, and
for persuading the generality of citizens to recognize discrepancies
when they occur.

Now our discussion of judicial abstinence from welfare-rights
claims has supposed that judges may approve a claim as in accordance
with moral theory coherently expressing popular morality, and yet
be incapable of performing the overt intellectual movements required
for valid judicial review (sometimes called "reasoned elaboration" of,
or "reasoned argument" from, accepted premises). If one believes,
as we have just posited, that courts are sometimes capable of recognizing discrepancies and convincing the public of their existence,
it is unclear how a court which privately acknowledged the coherence
of a claimed right with public morality would be incapable of demonstrating that coherence through reasoned argument-unless "reasoned
argument," perhaps surprisingly, means something different from
effective persuasion. The question we must face, then, is why we tend
to restrict the allowable mode of judicial persuasion to "reasoned
argument" in some narrow sense of simple chains of reasoning from
1 37

See text accompanying notes 109-21 supra.
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initially established premises or data. Why do we not embrace other
potentially effective modes of persuasive discourse, such as the patient,
roundabout, indeed circular, style of justification by coherence, of
which Rawls is such a notable exemplar?
The answer, not so mysteriously after all, lies in the intellectual
complexity that seems bound to attend efforts to justify moral theories,
and to derive specific rights from them by coherence-style argument.
The difficulty is perhaps adequately suggested by the first two parts of
this essay. We did not there undertake to review the many interconnecting strands of the fabric of arguments justifying the theory of
justice as fairness. Yet we did catch a glimpse of the kind of intellectual
effort demanded of one who would draw welfare rights out of a theory
so formulated that it can plausibly claim justification through the
coherence it lends to the considered moral judgments of contemporary
representative social critics. Even assuming that the coherence-justification of the theory, and the derivation of welfare rights from the
theory, could in principle be made ultimately compelling to the generality of citizens, the possibility remains that the intellectual journey is
too difficult and tortured to fit the Rawlsian account of judicial review.
The intrinsic values ascribed by justice as fairness to equal participatory rights, and their connection with the preeminent social good of selfrespect, 138 seem to indicate that Rawls contemplates fairly strict limits
on the intellectual capacities and exertions that may be demanded of
citizens as the condition of their being satisfied that controversial
judicial mandates are indeed correct-limits perhaps strict enough to
rule out judicial vindication of certain substantive rights which, Rawls
also teaches, would be honored in a good society.
Here, then, is the nub: certain societies may have reached a stage
of development in which shared or overlapping senses of justice are
implicit or emergent among the generality of citizens, but not fully and
explicitly acknowledged by most of them except, perhaps, in their rarest
moments of maximum lucidity and detachment. Such societies are
potentially but not actually in a well-ordered condition in which their
affairs are effectively regulated by shared principles of justice. It seems
that societies lying within this evolutionary range have the clearest
uses for judicial review that appeals directly to principles of justice.
But it also seems that the further such a society is from the actuality of
a well-ordered condition-the more primitively developed is its common sense of justice-the greater will be both that society's need for
such judicial review and the difficulty its judges will have in holding
138 See text accompanying notes 101-05 supra.
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to a tolerable level the associated costs in participatory inequality
which damages self-respect.
Thus it seems to be the terms of the trade-off between justice in
participatory rights and justice in substantive rights that would account, in a Rawlsian view, for the position that rights can be recognized only through judicial reasoning which proceeds simply from
previously established premises, or, in cases in which such reasoning
proves fruitless, through a new expression of political consensus
(through formalities of amending the constitution). On this interpretation, contemporary differences of view regarding the question of judicial "activism," and secular swings of general opinion on that question,
could be said to reflect differences or shifts in the relative weights accorded participatory equality and substantive rights, or differences in
perceptions about where our society stands along the range of potentially (but not actually) well-ordered ones.
B. Moral Theory as a Backdrop for Positive Entitlements:
The Question of Judicial Activism
Now judgments made within the foregoing frame of thought may
tell us that courts should not cut welfare rights out of the whole cloth
of speculative moral theory-not Rawls' theory, at any rate-and
foist them on resistant legislatures. But such judgments do not exhaust
the question of whether judges should ever allow such a moral theory to
become a guiding influence, or an acknowledged one, in adjudication.
There remain to be considered the inescapable judicial functions of
construing constitutional and statutory materials whose significance for
a given dispute is debatable, and of determining the correct application
to such materials of due process and equal protection guaranties in their
formal and non-substantive aspects. Perhaps a theory like Rawls' can
impart meaning and direction to judicial events occurring in the wake
of constitutional or legislative initiatives that arise, so far as the theory
is concerned, quite spontaneously.
For one thing, the theory may help us see that constitutional or
statutory establishment of insurance rights 139 may be understood as
fulfilling claims of justice and right. Insurance rights might otherwise
be viewed as mere responses to external economies of consumptionthat is, provision of goods and opportunities might be justified solely by
a perception that one person's enjoyment of those goods and opportuni139
The only such rights commonly encountered in extant American constitutions
pertain to education. For an example of a constitutionally protected right to education,
see note 128 supra.
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ties has consequences that are beneficial for others. 140 The externaleconomies explanation seems particularly well-suited for a scheme of
public provision of certain goods that uses a plan of general provision
rather than a needs test,' inasmuch as (1) any claims of justice and
rights might seem more naturally met by general monetary transfers,'142
and (2) the plan provides for persons who would not suffer involuntary deprivation in its absence-a gratuity most obviously explainable as a libertarian 1 43 response to a perception that without public
subsidy each individual would allocate less private income to the good
in question than would be socially optimal.
Our suggested account of constitutional welfare rights may help
us resist the external-economies explanation. It offers reasons why
social-minimum claims (i.e., claims of justice and right) might give rise
to constitutionally protected insurance rights.'44 It further helps us see
that legislation creating such rights may be regarded as justice-inspired
supplementation of the constitutional catalogue (if there is any) of
surrogates for the social minimum-as legislative recognition of items
omitted from the constitution, perhaps because the then-prevailing
evolutionary circumstances did not urgently suggest them (e.g., the
country was not so wealthy then, or so oriented to technology and educational credentials, or so committed to litigation as a way of resolving
14 0 The benefit may consist of allaying external diseconomies, and those diseconomies
might be moral as well as material. The members of society might be humanitarians,
made uncomfortable by awareness that other persons are experiencing certain kinds of
deprivations. See Musgrave, The Role of Social Insurance in an Overall Program for
Social Welfare, in Tan PamcEox Syn,'osrux: ox TH Aaru_. Sysr oF SocIAL
INSURANCE 23, 25 (W. Bowen ed. 1968). A speculative theory of justice might help us
account for these feelings. Insofar as it does, a purpose of dealing with "moral" external
economies of consumption will tend to merge with a purpose of doing justice.
141Under a "needs test" plan, public provision for the specified want is made only
insofar as the person in want cannot afford to satisfy it out of private income. Under a
"general provision" plan, provision is made for whoever has occasion to accept it, regardless of his private income. Public housing and public education, as commonly administered at present, illustrate the two plans respectively.
142 General monetary transfers are more respectful of the liberty of the recipient,
allowing him to define his own needs. With regard to certain, rather narrowly limited,
goods and circumstances, the notion of "paternalism" may provide an alternative rationale for the transformation of social-minimum claims into insurance rights. As Rawls
puts it, this notion reflects the fact that persons in the original position
will want to insure themselves against the possibility that their powers are undeveloped and they cannot rationally advance their interests, as in the case of
children; or that through some misfortune or accident they are unable to make
decisions for their good, as in the case of those seriously injured or mentally
disturbed.
*. . [Pjaternalistic intervention must be justified by the evident failure or
absence of reason and will . . . and [paternalistic principles] must not be interpreted to license assaults on one's convictions and character by any means so long
as these offer the prospect of securing consent later on.
RAwLs 248-50.
148 "Libertarian" because the method chosen is to subsidize, not compel, additional
consumption.
14 4
See text accompanying notes 121-23 supra.
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a wide range of controversies). Should the legislature become convinced
that good G, in addition to any others mentioned in the constitution,
must be covered by a just social minimum whose other components and
upper limits remain unspecifiable, a new insurance right seems an appropriate response, with or without a needs test.145 Moreover, the account suggests a special reason why such justice-inspired welfare rights
might be guaranteed to everyone regardless of need. This approach may
contribute to the workability of the legislative system by relieving it
from the baffling task of precisely identifying and costing all items in
the catalogue of surrogates before providing for those which it has
been able to identify. 4
Now one may fairly ask why it is at all important whether a
constitutional guaranty or legislative program is to be taken as impelled
exclusively by considerations of efficiency and external economies, or
rather (at least in part) by considerations of justice and rights. Are
these inferential understandings likely to have any effect on legislative
and judicial behavior? A legislature's failure to implement a constitutional guaranty understood to be for the benefit of the general public
which it directly represents is more easily excused-or at least over145 One possible objection to dispensing with a needs test and using a generalprovision plan (when the program's purpose supposedly is to satisfy claims of justice
and right rather than realize external economies of consumption) might be that a general-provision plan, by shielding all beneficiaries of the publicly financed operation from
having to pay specifically for benefits received (through fees, user charges, or special
assessments), unnecessarily impairs the combined effectiveness of the pricing and voting
processes in reaching an efficient allocation of resources through the public fisc. See R.
MUSORAVE, Taa THEORY OF PUBmc FinAwCE 116-35 (1959); and compare Rawis' discussion of the "exchange branch" at RAWLs 282-84. Put a little differently, the thought
would be that, as to all persons who can easily afford to pay full costs out of private
income, provision of a particular good or service "free"-ie., financing its cost out of
general revenues-can only be justified by, and so must imply, a judgment that the
good or service is best regarded as a "public good," for example because consumption
of it radiates indivisible external economies. But this seems hypertechnical. Consistent
with a view of the good or service in question as a welfare right would be a supposition that just about everyone who can afford to pay for it out of private income
would choose to do so were it not publicly provided. Cf. Michelman, supra note 17, at
30. Moreover, as previously discussed in the text, the cost of the entire welfare-rights
package is likely to be smaller than the appropriate minimum guaranteed income level.
Therefore, any provision out of general revenues of specified goods and services can be
taken into account, and distributionally neutralized, in public deliberations over, say,
the proper rate configuration (including negative rates) of the income tax.
146 Under the needs-test approach, a person is guaranteed a good or service insofar
as he needs it and cannot afford it. We have to consider, though, what is meant by the
statement that a person "cannot afford" something. What we usually mean, I think, is
that even if he had the means immediately available to pay for what he needs, the
result would be to force his consumption of some other good or service below some stated
or assumed level. In terms of the present discussion, we could say that a person cannot
"afford" the cost of satisfying a given need if paying it would disable him from satisfying other needs in the welfare-rights catalogue of surrogates for the just social minimum. Thus a needs-test approach entails the baffling task mentioned in the text. A
general-provision approach may alleviate the problem, but will not entirely avoid it.
The legislature will still need to consider whether provision for the watt in question
is likely to have economic ramifications that will rule out provision for other wants on
the emergent list, leaving the bottom's total situation without clear improvement.
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looked-than its failure to accord persons their rightful claims against
that represented public. Thus a convincing claim of justice-inspired
right may lend a special force to legislative advocacy. And it may
undergird judicial boldness and inventiveness in exploiting openings
and opportunities spontaneously provided by the legislature: although
a constitutional guaranty of, say, a "thorough and efficient education"
may not be deemed one which the court can enforce from scratchwhether because it entails the appropriation of funds and design of administrative structures, or because the standards of thoroughness and
efficiency are not justiciable' 7-- the court may yet find ways of building on legislative foundations, ways not necessarily contemplated or
welcomed by the legislature. And the same may be true where the welfare right which the legislature has spontaneously begun to honor cannot be connected with any specific constitutional text.
The last point deserves some expansion. It suggests further study
of the interplay between the legislative/administrative and judicial
branches in the process of revealing and realizing welfare rights. Can
it be said that there are some claims which, originating in legislative
actions which could not have been judicially compelled, are thereupon
accorded unusually assertive judicial support?14 8 And that the principles on which these claims are picked out bear logically expressible relationships to principles of justice or rights generated by intellectually
coherent philosophical theories? If so, a legislature which might lawfully have remained quiescent would find, once having adopted a
limited and qualified program for meeting needs favored by such
theories, that the limitations and qualifications would be placed under
severe strain by the judiciary. At the extreme, the courts might prevent
repeal of the program.' 49 Less drastically, the courts might invalidate
147 But see Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J. Super. 223, 287 A.2d 187, supplemented,
119 N.J. Super. 40, 289 A.2d 569 (1972), modified, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273, additional
opinion, 63 N.J. 196, 306 A.2d 65 (1973) (state system in which districts operated on
varying per-pupil expenditures, and some districts were markedly ill-equipped and ineffective, held unconstitutional under "thorough and efficient" requirement).
148 Consider the notion of "fundamental interests" capable of triggering "strict
review" in the two-tiered equal protection paradigm of recent glory. See, e.g., Michel-

man, supra note 17, at 22-23.
The utility and future prospects of the two-tier approach have recently been questioned by Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L.
Rv. 1, 8-20 (1972). But see the Supreme Court's even more recent confirmation of the
method in San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
149 Consider Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967), one of the famously
problematic decisions of recent years. Does it not suggest an affirmative duty on the
state's part to enact an antidiscrimination law-a duty whose initial performance
the Court could not compel because it had no way of settling questions involving the
proper locus of enforcement responsibility, administrative procedure, nature and
gravity of sanctions, marginal applications, and so forth? The enacted statute reflected
the legislature's preferences-or at least one-time preferences-concerning these matters.
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statutory eligibility conditions;' 50 strictly construe delegations of
authority to administrative officers to fashion such conditions; 15' impose exacting standards of procedural nicety in processing admission to
and exclusion from assistance; 5 2 invalidate seemingly plausible classifications among potential eligibles; 53 or create seemingly inflexible
requirements of equal expenditure for all program beneficiaries, perhaps as a device for ensuring that at least the minimum acceptable level
of service will be attained for all.' 54 The whole process may be interpreted as the judiciary's seizing upon a legislative initiative which it
could not, within separation-of-powers constraints, have compelled in
spite of felt claims of right, for the purpose of thenceforth securing
and expanding the fulfillment of such claims. Viewed from a more
global and detached perspective, the process may be regarded as one
of mutually reinforcing interaction between the two branches, built
into the constitution by the framers in the interest of justice.
Outright repeal (or, in this case, constitutional-amendment override) reflects no dissatisfaction with these adjective or finely balanced features of the law, but rather a
broadly unconstitutional purpose (as we are now supposing) of withdrawing protection
owed. In blocking repeal, the Court did not have to take on the uneasy task of reviewing legislative detail work and fine tuning (as would have been necessary under
a decree purporting to require initial enactment) or jeopardize its authority by inviting an intransigent legislature to answer a decree with inaction. (Even a subsequent
legislative refusal to appropriate funds to pay for enforcement could not prevent effectuation of the Court's will through private civil litigation.) See generally Karst & Horowitz, Reitman v. Mulkey: A Telophase of Substantive Equal Protection, 1967 S. CT.
REv. 39.
0

15 See Smith v. King, 277 F. Supp. 31 (M.D. Ala. 1967) (Alabama's "substitute
father" ("man-in-the-house") rule, as applied to federally-assisted AFDC programs,
denies equal protection), aff'd, 392 U.S. 309 (1968) (Alabama rule is invalid on grounds
of conflict with federal statute); id. at 334 (Douglas, J., concurring) (Alabama rule
denies equal protection); ef. Potts v. Breen, 167 Ill. 67, 47 N.E. 81 (1897) (state board
of health not authorized by statute to require vaccination as condition of school attendance; query whether statutory authorization would be valid in light of state constitution's guaranty of "a good common school education").
151See Alexander v. Thompson, 313 F. Supp. 1389 (C.D. Cal. 1970) (state statute
empowering local school board to "prescribe rules ... for the government and discipline of the schools" would be unconstitutional delegation if construed to authorize
grooming regulations leading to exclusion from school); Potts v. Breen, 167 Ill. 67, 47
N.E. 81 (1897).
152See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (due-process hearing required prior
to terminating welfare payments on grounds of recipient's noneligibility); Holmes v.
New York City Housing Auth., 398 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1968) (N.Y.C. Housing Authority,
receiving 90,000 applications and admitting 10,000 families annually, may violate due
process by not processing applications chronologically or in accordance with published
standards, or by lot, "or in any other reasonable and systematic manner," by not notifying applicants of their status and by not disclosing reasons for rejecting applications).
53
1 See Thomas v. Housing Auth., 282 F. Supp. 575 (E.D. Ark. 1967) (defendant's
regulation excluding unwed mothers not authorized by statutory delegation of power to
make needful regulations consistent with public housing statutes, even though purpose was to avoid objectionable behavior in project; regulation is rigid and overbroad
and "does not square with the humane purpose of the low rent housing program," id. at
581); cf. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (requirement of a year's residence
in state, as condition of eligibility for public assistance, unconstitutionally burdens right
of interstate travel). But see Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), rev'g 297 F.
Supp. 450 (D. Md. 1969).
54
1 See Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
Contra, San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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This interpretation supposes (adopting once again for a moment
the judiciary's perspective rather than the more global one) that the
same legislature which could not be compelled in the first place to inaugurate a welfare-rights program can nevertheless be led by judicial
pressure and authority to deepen and expand such a program once
adopted, without prohibitive risk that the obvious alternative of legislative withdrawal will occur. A part of the hypothesis, then, is that courts
make judgments (call them tactical judgments, if you like) about these
likelihoods; and that these judgments will prove to reflect accurate
judicial intuitions or perceptions of the degree to which the legislative
initiative can be seen as responding to claims of natural rights-that is,
as consisting with an emergent public sense of justice expressible by
principles in a coherent theory of justice. If the hypothesis to this
extent seems appealing, then further steps may be suggested: that as
judges go about their business of selectively translating constitutional
and statutory offerings into welfare rights-as they play their role in the
authorship of positive entitlements-they should conscientiously try
to clarify in their own minds some systematic moral theory which justifies and accounts for their decisions, should not shrink from incorporating such thought in their public explanations of what they do, and
should be prepared at an appropriate stage in the emergence of a welfare right to declare that such a right exists. Such judicial behavior at
any rate would seem to accord with our suggested Rawlsian account of
welfare rights and judicial review under nonideal conditions.155
C. Moral Theory and Neutral Principles
All of this may have some bearing on the problem of neutrality of
principle in constitutional adjudication.'" One tries to understand various legal claims and entitlements in a certain way-that is, as reflecting
"natural rights" which in turn are suggested by principles of justice in
a coherent theory of justice. Then neither rights nor principles can
stand in isolation from any other rights or principles contained in or
suggested by the same theory. A right is valid only for cases to which it
properly applies under the theory which supports it; every right is
bounded by other rights, every principle must connect with other principles. A right too far distended is injustice. As Professor Deutsch,
following Ernest Brown, correctly insists, there can be no ultimate,
155 See text accompanying notes 109-21 supra.
150 For discussion of neutrality in constitutional adjudication, see A. BIcx.EL, supra
note 94, at 49-65; H. WECESrER, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, in
PRICmiPLEs, PoLiTIs, AND FuNDAmTAL LAW 3 (1961); Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy,

and the Supreme Court: Some Intersections Between Law and Political Science, 20 STxas.
L. REV. 169, 178-97 (1968).
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total "neutrality" in the application of principles to cases, unless the
principles used all belong to one family of revealed principles whose
members are exhaustively interlaced across the whole universe-or
at least a sizeable and somewhat self-contained region-of social
7
problems.'
Suppose a statutory public-housing program is administered in a
way that promotes or supports a demeaning, stigmatizing kind of racial
segregation; and that judicial proscription of that method of administration seems most likely to result not in correction but in termination
of the program. Constitutional texts provide no unambiguous guidance,
and the problem at first glance seems to have no obviously satisfactory
solution." 58 A judge imbued with Rawls' theory does at least have recourse to a principled way of organizing and directing the search for an
answer. The judge may consider that the housing program is reflective
of moral entitlements, and may further consider that the existing
method of administration seems severely damaging to the goal of advancing self-respect deemed centrally important in the same moral
theory that suggests the moral-entitlement interpretation of the housing
program. Thus the case seems to pit a welfare-rights principle against
a self-respect principle. The virtue of the moral theory, insofar as it is
found persuasive, lies in its suggestion that welfare rights ideally work
in the service of self-respect. 5 9 There may be reason to believe, in the
existing non-ideal situation in which the principles are in immediate
conflict, that short-term subordination of self-respect to welfare will
yield a long-term strengthening of self-respect. If not, the welfare program must lose out-that is, the court must insist on its being administered in a way that predictably will lead to its demise. Whatever the
conclusion, it will seem more bearable if the court can give a neutral
explanation for it-one which both has some persuasive force and will
not be embarrassing in future cases. A comprehensive, coherent theory
of social justice, such as Rawls has attempted, holds out the hope that
such explanations can be given. The theory, as Rawls would have it,
serves as
a guiding framework designed to focus our moral sensibilities
and to put before our intuitive capacities more limited and
manageable questions for judgment ....

If the scheme as a

whole seems on reflection to clarify and order our thoughts,
and if it tends to reduce disagreements and to bring divergent
157Deutsch, supra note 156, at 187-90; Brown, Book Review, 62 CoLum. L.
386 (1962).

REv.

158 See, e.g., Note, Public Housing and Urban Policy: Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous79 YAL L... 712 (1970).
ing Authority,
59
1

See text accompanying notes 62-71, 77-80 supra.
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convictions more in line, then it has done all that one may
reasonably ask.' 00
Professor Deutsch seems satisfied that there can be no comprehensive moral theory capable of imbuing judicial handiwork, extended
over time and subject matter, with such neutrality as we have been
considering. He may be right; but it is important to see just what his
denial means. A work like Rawls' suggests that such a theory is not a
logical or verbal impossibility. More study is needed, but it would not
amaze me if Rawls' theory does turn out to be worthily comprehensive
and coherent-that it does offer reasons, both general and somewhat
persuasive, that help organize the search for answers across a broad
spectrum of testing cases.
If so, then Professor Deutsch's denial must refer not to natural
limitations on the achievable scope, refinement, or internal coherence
of possible theories of social justice, but to the illegitimacy of transforming any such theory into law-of certifying it for deployment by
judges. That, of course, is no trivial problem. But its ultimate significance must be judged in light of three interrelated features of Rawls'
theory. First, the theory, while coherent and comprehensive, is at the
same time "loose." It consists of broad principles which derive their
meaning not from verbal precision but from the rich cumulation of
persuasions-some scientific, some traditional, some intuitive-in which
they are embedded. There is no possibility that the theory could be
applied in any automatic way, or be transformed into a code susceptible
of automatic application. Second, popular decision processes are strongly
valued by the theory.' 6' There is no possibility that judges imbued with
' Third,
it could ever lose sight of the "counter-majoritarian difficulty."' 62
the theory seeks ultimate justification by its claimed coherence with the
latent morality of the people. And this gets us back to Professor Deutsch
who, despairing of ultimate neutrality through an exhaustive and coherent system of principles of justice, suggests instead that a principle
is applied neutrally if it is applied harmoniously with popular will and
understanding. 1 3 Rawls' effort suggests the possibility that Deutsch's
two interpretations of neutrality-the totally objective view which he
finds impossible and the qualified, public-acceptance view which he
espouses-may in the end be made convergent.
The vehicle of convergence would be something akin to the reflective equilibration which lies at the core of Rawlsian moral argu160 RAWL 53.
16 1
See text accompanying notes 101-05 supra.
162 A. BicKEL, supra note 94, at 16-23.
163 See Deutsch, supra note 156, at 192-97.
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ment. "Reflective equilibrium" perhaps offers a paradigm of judicial
review:
In describing our sense of justice an allowance must be made
for the likelihood that considered judgments are no doubt
subject to certain irregularities and distortions despite the
fact that they are rendered under favorable circumstances.
When a person is presented with an intuitively appealing account of his sense of justice (one, say, which embodies various reasonable and natural presumptions), he may well revise
his judgments to conform to its principles even though the
theory does not fit his existing judgments exactly. He is especially likely to do this if he can find an explanation for
the deviations which undermine his confidence in his original
judgments and if the conception presented yields a judgment
which he finds he can now accept.... [T]he best account of

a person's sense of justice is not the one which fits his judgments prior to his examining any conception of justice, but
rather the one which matches his judgments in reflective
equilibrium ....

[T]his state is one reached after a person

has weighed various proposed conceptions and he has either
revised his judgments to accord with one of them or held fast
to his initial convictions (and the corresponding conception) 164 [or made mutual adjustments in both convictions and
conceptions] .15

Can we see the courts as arbiters in such a process at a public level?
Could a theory like Rawls' serve as the initial matrix for this processas the provisional "conception" which is thenceforth dialectically to be
brought into harmony with the network of "considered judgments"
reflected in statutes, customary forms of social behavior, constitutional
texts and historical traditions (including those concerned with the intent of the framers)? The answer to the latter question depends entirely on how successfully Rawls has been able to do what he set out
to do.
To some this will seem (as it does to me at times) an utterly
trivial thesis, without explanatory power or practical significance. Its
triviality seems to turn on how fanciful one finds the notion (I have
swings of mood about it) that there will someday appear some speculative moral theory which displays both sufficient incisiveness to contribute toward the solution of testing cases, and sufficiently persuasive
and accessible coherence with latent popular morality to deserve judicial recognition. At the very least, the thesis may counsel skepticism
164 RAwLs

48.

U See id, 20,
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toward any insistence that the legal and moral orders are, logically and
intrinsically, worlds apart, separated if not by a void then by an ether
through which (at most) only occasional and inarticulate influences
can pass. It denies that adjudication is a process inherently incapable
of handling the kind of stuff of which moral philosophy is made, much
as our intuitive arithmetical imagination cannot handle numbers compounded of the square root of minus-one. It suggests that the difficulty
we experience is not with the logical possibility of interlacing moral
speculation and law, but with the state and condition of moral theory
itself-a state characterized by complexity causing inaccessibility and
irresolvable controversy. Who dares predict that this state can ever be
transcended? Not I; at least not now. But I will confess that Professor
Rawls persuades me to keep my mind open.

